Text Compendium 2-13-2017

 Extended Reading List(“Temporal Experience”)

Material to categorize from philpapers.org:
 
  1. James Aho (2011). Michael G. Flaherty: The Textures of Time: Agency and Temporal Experience. [REVIEW] Human Studies 34 (1):111-113.

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  2. Jan Almäng (2012). Time, Mode and Perceptual Content. Acta Analytica 27 (4):425-439.
    Francois Recanati has recently argued that each perceptual state has two distinct kinds of content, complete and explicit content. According to Recanati, the former is a function of the latter and the psychological mode of perception. Furthermore, he has argued that explicit content is temporally neutral and that time-consciousness is a feature of psychological mode. In this paper it is argued, pace Recanati, that explicit content is not temporally neutral. Recanati’s position is initially presented. Three desiderata for a theory of (…)

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      1 citation  

  3. Pedro M. S. Alves (2008). Objective Time and the Experience of Time: Husserl’s Theory of Time in Light of Some Theses of A. Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity. Husserl Studies 24 (3):205-229.
    In this paper, I start with the opposition between the Husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time as it comes out of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the world, starting (…)

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  4. J. Aschoff (1992). On the Dilatability of Subjective Time. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 35 (2):276-280.

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  5. Adrian Bardon (ed.) (2011). The Future of the Philosophy of Time. Routledge.
    The last century has seen enormous progress in our understanding of time. This volume features original essays by the foremost philosophers of time discussing the goals and methodology of the philosophy of time, and examining the best way to move forward with regard to the field’s core issues. The collection is unique in combining cutting edge work on time with a focus on the big picture of time studies as a discipline. The major questions asked include: What are the implications (…)

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  6. Christopher Belshaw (2000). Death, Pain and Time. Philosophical Studies 97 (3):317-341.

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      1 citation  

  7. Ermanno Bencivenga (1993). A Specious Puzzle. Erkenntnis 38 (1):131 – 133.

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  8. Henri Bergson (1913). Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Dover Publications.
    First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

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      28 citations  

  9. Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.) (2005). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience’s insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in (…)

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      1 citation  

  10. John B. Brough (ed.) (2000). The Many Faces of Time. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
    The authors of the essays collected in this volume continue that tradition, challenging, expanding, and deepening it.

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  11. J. Brown (2000). Mind and Nature: Essays on Time and Subjectivity. Whurr Publishers.
    This collection of essays extends the microgenetic theory of the mind/brain state to basic problems in process psychology and philosophy of mind. The author’s microtemporal model of brain activity and psychological events, which was originally based on clinical studies of patients with focal brain damage, is here extended to such topics as the concept of the moment in Buddhist philosophy, conscious and unconscious thought, the nature of the self, subjective time and aesthetic perception. The author develops a highly original psychology (…)

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      1 citation  

  12. Ronald Bruzina (2000). There is More to the Phenomenology of Time Than Meets the Eye. In John B. Brough (ed.), The Many Faces of Time. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 67-84.

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  13. Robert G. Burton (1976). The Human Awareness of Time: An Analysis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):303-318.

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  14. Jeremy Butterfield (1998). Questions of Time and Tense. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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      2 citations  

  15. Jeremy Butterfield (1998). Seeing the Present. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 161-176.

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      3 citations  

  16. Krister Bykvist (1999). All Time Preferences? Theoria 65 (1):36-54.

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  17. Roderick M. Chisholm (1981). Brentano’s Analysis of the Consciousness of Time. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):3-16.

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      6 citations  

  18. Y. Christen & P. S. Churchland (eds.) (1992). Neurophilosophy and Alzheimer’s Disease. Springer Verlag.

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  19. Philippe Chuard (2011). Temporal Experiences and Their Parts. Philosophers’ Imprint 11 (11).
    The paper develops an objection to the extensional model of time consciousness—the view that temporally extended events or processes, and their temporal properties, can be directly perceived as such. Importantly, following James, advocates of the extensional model typically insist that whole experiences of temporal relations between non-simultaneous events are distinct from mere successions of their temporal parts. This means, presumably, that there ought to be some feature(s) differentiating the former from the latter. I try to show why the extensional models (…)

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      4 citations  

  20. Richard M. Cobb-Stevens (1998). James and Husserl: Time-Consciousness and the Intentionality of Presence and Absence. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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  21. David Cockburn (1997). Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present, and Future. Cambridge University Press.
    We view things from a certain position in time: in our language, thought, feelings and actions, we draw distinctions between what has happened, is happening, and will happen. Current approaches to this feature of our lives – those seen in disputes between tensed and tenseless theories, between realist and anti-realist treatments of past and future, and in accounts of historical knowledge – embody serious misunderstandings of the character of the issues; they misconstrue the relation between metaphysics and ethics, and the (…)

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      1 citation  

  22. A. B. D. (1964). The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):177-177.

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  23. Barry F. Dainton (2003). Time in Experience: Reply to Gallagher. Psyche 9 (12).
    Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In “Stream of Consciousness” I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Husserl (…)

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      8 citations  

  24. Rickard Donovan (1977). The Human Experience of Time. International Philosophical Quarterly 17 (3):350-352.

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  25. Elizabeth R. Eames (1986). Russell and the Experience of Time. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):681-682.

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  26. Bernard C. Ewer (1909). The Time Paradox in Perception. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (6):145-149.

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  27. B. A. Farrell (1973). Temporal Precedence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:193-216.

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  28. Donald Ferrari & Melanie Ferrari (eds.) (2001). Consciousness in Time. Heidelberg: C Winter University Verlag.

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  29. J. N. Findlay (1956). Report on Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse? Analysis 16 (June):121.

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  30. Joan Forman (1978). The Mask of Time: The Mystery Factor in Timeslips, Precognition and Hindsight. Macdonald & Jane’s.

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  31. Georg Franck (2004). Mental Presence and the Temporal Present. In Gordon G. Globus, Karl H. Pribram & Giuseppe Vitiello (eds.), Brain and Being: At the Boundary Between Science, Philosophy, Language and Arts. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

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  32. J. T. Fraser (1987). Time, the Familiar Stranger. University of Massachusetts Press.
    Looks at the history of the idea of time, the origins of the universe, relativity, life, the brain’s perception of time, aging, death, memory, and time keeping …

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      1 citation  

  33. E. J. Furlong (1953). The Specious Present. Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy 7:180-185.

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  34. Shaun Gallagher (1998). The Inordinance of Time. Northwestern University Press.
    Shaun Gallagher’s The Inordinance of Time develops an account of the experience of time at the intersection of three approaches: phenomenology, cognitive …

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      9 citations  

  35. Shaun Gallagher (1979). Suggestions Towards a Revision of Husserl’s Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness. Man and World 12 (4):445-464.
    In this paper I offer four distinct but related suggestions: (1) That Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness is an adequate account of the concept of the specious present; (2) That the Querschtfftt o5 momentary phase of consdousness is genuinely only a Querschnittanskht; (3) That retention, primal-impression, and protention are functions of consciousness rather than phases or types o.f coasdousness; (4) That further conceptual clarification and terminological reformulation is needed.

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      1 citation  

  36. André Gallois (1994). Asymmetry in Attitudes and the Nature of Time. Philosophical Studies 76 (1):51-69.

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      1 citation  

  37. Gordon G. Globus, Karl H. Pribram & Giuseppe Vitiello (eds.) (2004). Brain and Being. John Benjamins.

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  38. David B. Greene (1984). Mahler: Consciousness And Temporality. Gordon & Breach.

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  39. Rick Grush (2006). How to, and How Not to, Bridge Computational Cognitive Neuroscience and Husserlian Phenomenology of Time Consciousness. Synthese 153 (3):417-450.
    A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts.

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      6 citations  

  40. Rick Grush (2005). Brain Time and Phenomenological Time. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 160.
    … there are cases in which on the basis of a temporally extended content of consciousness a unitary apprehension takes place which is spread out over a temporal interval (the so-called specious present). … That several successive tones yield a melody is possible only in this way, that the succession of psychical processes are united “forthwith” in a common structure.

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      5 citations  

  41. Kristin Guyot (1986). Specious Individuals. Philosophica 37.

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  42. P. Haggard & J. Cole (2007). Intention, Attention and the Temporal Experience of Action. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):211-220.
    Subjects estimated the time of intentions to perform an action, of the action itself, or of an auditory effect of the action. A perceptual attraction or binding effect occurred between actions and the effects that followed them. Judgements of intentions did not show this binding, suggesting they are represented independently of actions and their effects. In additional unpredictable judgement conditions, subjects were instructed only after each trial which of these events to judge, thus discouraging focussed attention to a specific event. (…)

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      12 citations  

  43. Stuart R. Hameroff (2003). Time, Consciousness, and Quantum Events in Fundamental Space-Time Geometry. In R. Buccheri (ed.), The Nature of Time: Geometry, Physics and Perception. pp. 77-89.
    1. Introduction: The problems of time and consciousness What is time? St. Augustine remarked that when no one asked him, he knew what time was; however when someone asked him, he did not. Is time a process which flows? Is time a dimension in which processes occur? Does time actually exist? The notion that time is a process which “flows” directionally may be illusory (the “myth of passage”) for if time did flow it would do so in some medium or (…)

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  44. C. L. Hardin (1984). Thank Goodness It’s Over There! Philosophy 59 (227):121 – 125.

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  45. Alfred Hodder (1902). The Adversaries of the Sceptic or the Specious Present. Philosophical Review 11 (1):74-76.

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  46. Alfred Hodder (1901). The Adversaries of the Sceptic; or, the Specious Present, a New Inquiry Into Human Knowledge.

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  47. Shadworth H. Hodson (1900). Perception of Change and Duration-a Reply. Mind 9 (34):240-243.

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  48. Christoph Hoerl (2009). Review: The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation, by Robin Le Poidevin. [REVIEW] Mind 118 (470):485-489.

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  49. Ronald C. Hoy (1976). A Note on Gustav Bergmann’s Treatment of Temporal Consciousness. Philosophy of Science 43 (4):610-617.

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      2 citations  

  50. Ronald C. Hoy (1976). Science and Temporal Experience: A Critical Defense. Philosophy Research Archives 1156:646-670.
    Temporal consciousness is philosophically problematic because it appears to have features that cannot be analyzed in a way compatible with the fundamental view of time as a one-dimensional order of events. For example, it seems to be a manifest fact of experience that within a strictly present state of consciousness one can be immediately aware of a succession of events, yet the standard view of time denies that successive events can co-exist, so how can they be given together in a (…)

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      1 citation  

  51. Curtis M. Hutt (1999). Husserl: Perception and the Ideality of Time. Philosophy Today 43 (4):370-385.

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  52. Jenann Ismael (2011). Temporal Experience. In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press.

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  53. Vijay Iyer (2004). Improvisation, Temporality and Embodied Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (3-4):159-173.
    This journal’s well-intentioned consideration of the arts has turned out to be quite the Pandora’s box. As soon as we broach the subject of aesthetics, we are already in the realm of ideology; as soon as we impose the frame of scientific inquiry upon any subject, we invoke another kind of ideology. The previous issues in this series have depicted the unfolding of an ideological clash of cultures between sciences and the humanities, enough to make C.P. Snow blush. For the (…)

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  54. David Martel Johnson (1974). The Temporal Dimension of Perceptual Experience: A Non-Traditional Empiricism. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):71-76.

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  55. Carol A. Kates (1970). Perception and Temporality in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Philosophy Today 14 (2):89-100.
    The article is an explication of husserl’s theory of perception. In particular, The meaning of ‘constitution’ is analyzed, With the result that traditional realistic or idealistic readings of husserl are discarded. Examination of passive and active synthesis and the meaning of ‘hyle’ within the framework of husserl’s theory of inner time-Consciousness clarifies in turn the nature of phenomenological intuition and the significance of reduction.

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  56. Sean D. Kelly (forthcoming). On Time and Truth. In Kurt J. Pritzl (ed.), Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy. Catholic University of America Press.

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  57. Cathrine Kietz (2015). Temporal Conflict in the Reading Experience. In Frederik Stjernfelt & Peer F. Bundgaard (eds.), Investigations Into the Phenomenology and the Ontology of the Work of Art. Springer Verlag.

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  58. Mary J. Larrabee (1993). Inside Time-Consciousness: Diagramming the Flux. Husserl Studies 10 (3):181-210.
    The usual metaphor for time is a flow. Edmund Husserl, in describing experience of our inner temporality, uses the term often: Fluss. In the final three decades of his life (1900s to 1930s), he gives us a well-articulated theory of time, especially the experience of its ongoingness and of our- selves in the processing of time. He refers to this latter, our immanent temporality, as a “flux” or flow and thus calls up the image of the river moving along with (…)

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  59. Mary J. Larrabee (1989). Time and Spatial Models: Temporality in Husserl. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3):373-392.
    Recent treatments of time in husserl purport to give an account of the most fundamental aspects of what husserl terms inner time-Consciousness, The immanent temporality that is the primal constitutive source of human experience. A major difficulty with these presentations of husserl’s time-Theory is that they continue to use theoretically reductionist models for time, Based on a sense of “flow” that is drawn from objective-Physical space and objects extended through such space. Such treatments fail to capture the very heart of (…)

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      1 citation  

  60. Robin Le Poidevin (2008). The Experience and Perception of Time. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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      9 citations  

  61. Robin Le Poidevin (2007). The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation. Oxford University Press.
    Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 1 kapitel eller op til 5% af teksten.

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      19 citations  

  62. Robin le Poidevin (2004). A Puzzle Concerning Time Perception. Synthese 142 (1):109-142.
    According to a plausible and influential account of perceptual knowledge, the truth-makers of beliefs that constitute perceptual knowledge must feature in the causal explanation of how we acquire those beliefs. However, this account runs into difficulties when it tries to accommodate time perception — specifically perception of order and duration — since the features we are apparently tracking in such perception are not causal. The central aim of the paper is to solve this epistemological puzzle. Two strategies are examined. The (…)

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      2 citations  

  63. Robin Le Poidevin (ed.) (1998). Questions of Time and Tense. Oxford University Press.
    This book brings together new essays on a major focus of debate in contemporary metaphysics: does time really pass, or is our ordinary experience of time as consisting of past, present, and future an illusion? The international contributors broaden this debate by demonstrating the importance of questions about the nature of time for philosophical issues in ethics, aesthetics, psychology, science, religion, and language.

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      6 citations  

  64. Eric Levy (2006). The Specious Present and Bi-Directional Time in Woolf’s To The Lighthouse. Literature & Aesthetics 16 (2):45-74.

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  65. Genevieve Lloyd (1993). Being in Time: Selves and Narrators in Philosophy and Literature. Routledge.
    Being in Time is a provocative and accessible essay on the fragmentation of the self as explored in philosophy and literature. This original study is unique in its focus on the literary aspects of philosophical writing and their interactions with philosophical content. It explores the emotional aspects of the human experience of time commonly neglected in philosophical investigation by looking at how narrative creates and treats the experience of the self as fragmented and the past as “lost.” Genevieve Lloyd demonstrates (…)

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      5 citations  

  66. T. Loveday (1900). Perception of Change and Duration-Some Additional Notes. Mind 9 (35):384-388.

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  67. Melvin Lyon (1992). Somewhere in Time – Temporal Factors in Vertebrate Movement Analysis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):282-283.

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  68. Jean-Paul M. Marchand (1974). The Temporal Character of Experience in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead. Dissertation, Fordham University

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  69. Henry Rutgers Marshall (1904). Of `Time Perception’. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (23):629-636.

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  70. J. L. Martin (1973). The Duality of the Present. Man and World 6 (3):293-301.
    A reflection upon the experience of time reveals two data : An infinitely rapid flow of nows through the present, and the unmoving everpresence of the now in which I live. This all-pervasive duality of the present is implicit in many analyses of time, including Husse’rl’s, but it needs to, be made ex- plicit. Although our data are, by the nature of the case, perfectly available for our inspection, their explication is not easy (as Augustine’s frustration indicates). Consequently, the explication (…)

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  71. Franklin C. Mason (1997). The Presence of Experience and Two Theses About Time. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):75-89.

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  72. Glen Mazis (1992). Merleau-Ponty and the Backward Flow of Time: The Reversibility of Temporality and the Temporality of Reversibility. In Shaun Gallagher Thomas Busch (ed.), Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism.

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      2 citations  

  73. Peter K. McInerney (1991). Time and Experience. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
    Introduction Ordinary experience seems both to take place in time and to concern things that happen in time. This seemingly simple fact is the starting …

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      4 citations  

  74. Peter K. McInerney (1988). What is Still Valuable in Husserl’s Analyses of Inner Time-Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 85 (11):605-616.

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      1 citation  

  75. James Mensch (2010). Husserl’s Account of Our Consciousness of Time. Marquette University Press.
    Having asked, “What, then, is time?” Augustine admitted, “I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled.” We all have a sense of time, but the description and explanation of it remain remarkably elusive. Through a series of detailed descriptions, Husserl attempted to clarify this sense of time. In my book, I trace the development of his account of our temporal self-awareness, starting (…)

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      2 citations  

  76. Philip Merlan (1947). Time Consciousness in Husserl and Heidegger. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8 (1):23-54.

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      2 citations  

  77. David L. Miller (1976). William James and the Specious Present. In Walter Robert Corti (ed.), The Philosophy of William James. Meiner. pp. 51–79.

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  78. Izchak Miller (1984). Husserl, Perception, And Temporal Awareness. MIT Press.
    This book clarifies Husserl’s notion of perceptual experience as “immediate” or “direct” with respect to its purported object, and outlines his theory of evidence. In particular, it focuses on Husserl’s account of our perceptual experience of time, an aspect of perception rarely noted in’, recent philosophical literature, yet which must be taken into consideration if an adequate account of perception is to be provided. Perhaps equally important, there is a new wave of work in phenomenology (and intentionality), reflecting a synthesis (…)

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      28 citations  

  79. Jitendranath Mohanty (1988). Time: Linear or Cyclic, and Husserl’s Phenomenology of Inner Time Consciousness. Philosophia Naturalis 25 (1/2):123-130.

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  80. Bruno Mölder (2014). Constructing Time: Dennett and Grush on Temporal Representation. In Valtteri Arstila & Dan Lloyd (eds.), Subjective Time: Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Temporality. MIT Press. pp. 217-238.

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  81. Bruno Mölder (2014). How Philosophical Models Explain Time Consciousness. Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 126:48-57.
    This paper analyses explanations provided by current philosophical models of time consciousness. These models attempt to explain temporal experience by describing the mechanisms of time consciousness in experiential terms. I criticize this practice on two grounds; firstly, it relies upon folk notions that have no clear individuation conditions and secondly because it often merely names, but does not explain the phenomena.

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  82. Thomas Natsoulas (2006). On the Temporal Continuity of Human Consciousness: Is James’s Firsthand Description, After All, “Inept”? Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (2):121-148.
    Contrary to James’s emphasis on the sensible continuity of each personal consciousness, our purported “stream,” as it presents itself to us, is not accurately described as having a flowing temporal structure; thus Strawson has argued based on how he finds his own consciousness to be. Accordingly, qua object of inner awareness, our consciousness is best characterized as constituted successively by pulses of consciousness separated in time, one from the next, by a momentary state of complete unconsciousness. It seems at times (…)

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  83. Gregory M. Nixon (2010). Editorial: Time & Experience: Twins of the Eternal Now? Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (5):482-489.
    In what follows, I suggest that, against most theories of time, there really is an actual present, a now, but that such an eternal moment cannot be found before or after time. It may even be semantically incoherent to say that such an eternal present exists since “it” is changeless and formless (presumably a dynamic chaos without location or duration) yet with creative potential. Such a field of near-infinite potential energy could have had no beginning and will have no end, (…)

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  84. Gregory M. Nixon (2010). Whitehead & the Elusive Present: Process Philosophy’s Creative Core. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (5):625-639.
    Time’s arrow is necessary for progress from a past that has already happened to a future that is only potential until creatively determined in the present. But time’s arrow is unnecessary in Einstein’s so-called block universe, so there is no creative unfolding in an actual present. How can there be an actual present when there is no universal moment of simultaneity? Events in various places will have different presents according to the position, velocity, and nature of the perceiver. Standing against (…)

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  85. Alva NoË (2006). Experience of the World in Time. Analysis 66 (1):26-32.

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  86. P. Novak (1996). Buddhist Meditation and Consciousness of Time. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (3):267-77.
    This paper first reviews key Buddhist concepts of time anicca , khanavada and uji and then describes the way in which a particular form of Bhuddist meditation, vipassana, may be thought to actualize them in human experience. The chief aim of the paper is to present a heuristic model of how vipassana meditation, by eroding dispositional tendencies rooted in the body-unconscious alters psychological time, transforming our felt-experience of time from a binding to a liberating force.

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  87. L. Nathan Oaklander (2002). Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:73-.

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  88. Douglas Odegard (1978). Locke and the Specious Present. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 4:141.

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  89. Douglas Odegard (1978). Locke and the Specious Present. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (sup1):141-151.

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  90. Douglas Odegard (1978). Phenomenal Time. Ratio 20 (December):116-122.

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  91. J. E. Orme (1969). Time, Experience and Behaviour. Illife.

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      2 citations  

  92. Michael Pelczar (2010). Must an Appearance of Succession Involve a Succession of Appearances? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):49-63.
    It is argued that a subject who has an experience as of succession can have this experience at a time, or over a period of time, during which there occurs in him no succession of conscious mental states at all. Various metaphysical implications of this conclusion are explored. One premise of the main argument is that every experience is an experience as of succession. This implies that we cannot understand phenomenal temporality as a relation among experiences, but only as a (…)

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  93. John Perry (2001). Time, Consciousness and the Knowledge Argument. In The Importance of Time: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society, 1995-2000. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

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  94. John Perry (2001). The Importance of Time: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society, 1995-2000. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

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  95. Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.) (1999). Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford University Press.
    This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition—with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and …

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  96. Ian Phillips (ed.) (forthcoming). Handbook of The Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge.

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  97. Ian Phillips (ed.) (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge.
    Experience is inescapably temporal. But how do we experience time? Temporal experience is a fundamental subject in philosophy – according to Husserl, the most important and difficult of all. Its puzzles and paradoxes were of critical interest from the Early Moderns through to the Post-Kantians. After a period of relative neglect temporal experience is again at the forefront of debates across a wealth of areas, from philosophy of mind and psychology, to metaphysics and aesthetics. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of (…)

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  98. Ian Phillips (2014). Experience of and in Time. Philosophy Compass 9 (2):131-144.
    How must experience of time be structured in time? In particular, does the following principle, which I will call inheritance, hold: for any temporal property apparently presented in perceptual experience, experience itself has that same temporal property. For instance, if I hear Paul McCartney singing ‘Hey Jude’, must my auditory experience of the ‘Hey’ itself precede my auditory experience of the ‘Jude’, or can the temporal order of these experiences come apart from the order the words are experienced as having? (…)

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  99. Walter B. Pitkin (1913). Time and the Percept. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (12):309-319.

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  100. Robert F. Port (1991). Can Complex Temporal Patterns Be Automatized? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):762-764.

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  101. Simon Prosser (2013). Experience, Thought, and the Metaphysics of Time. In Kasia M. Jaszczolt & Louis de Saussure (eds.), Time: Language, Cognition & Reality. Oxford University Press. pp. 1–157.
    In this chapter I argue that there can be no mental representation of objective ‘tensed’ features of reality of the kind that might be thought to occur when we experience time passing or think of times as past, present or future, whether or not such features are part of mind-independent reality. This, I hold, has important consequences for metaphysics; but (as will be most relevant to this volume) it is also likely to have important consequences for a correct semantics for (…)

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  102. Joseph Rivera (2013). Figuring the Porous Self: St. Augustine and the Phenomenology of Temporality. Modern Theology 29 (1):83-103.
    This article examines the phenomenological structures of the homo temporalis filtered through Augustine’s illuminating, if unsystematic, insights on temporality and the imago Dei. It situates such a phenomenological interpretation of the Augustinian self in view of current interpretations that polarize or split the Augustinian self into an either/or scheme—either an “interior” self or an “exterior” self. Given this imbalance, the article suggests that a phenomenological evaluation of Augustine brings to light how interior and exterior spheres are deeply integrated. The article (…)

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  103. Rebecca Roache (1999). Mellor and Dennett on the Perception of Temporal Order. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):231-238.
    I discuss theories about the way in which we determine the precedence ofperceived events. I examine Mellor’s account, which claims that it is thetiming of our perceptions of events that enables us to determine their order,and Dennett’s criticism of this. Dennett cites psychological experimentswhich suggest that it is the content of our perceptions, rather than theirtiming, which allows us to determine the order of the events perceived. Iargue that by distinguishing between two different ways of construing‘perception’ we can see not (…)

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  104. Stephen E. Robbins (2007). Time, Form and the Limits of Qualia. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (1):19-43.
    Our understanding of qualia is extremely weak when considerations of time are brought into play. Ignored has been the fact that the scale of time imposed by the brain on the events of the matter-field already defines quality, and that there is an essential “primary memory” or continuity of time that underlies all qualitative events. This weakness is magnified when the concept of qualia is applied to form. The origin of the dilemma lies in the fact that the problem of (…)

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  105. Stephen E. Robbins (2002). Semantics, Experience and Time. Cognitive Systems Research 3 (3):301-337.
    The computational hypothesis, with its inherent representationalism, and the dynamical hypothesis, with its apparent absence of representations and its commitment to continuous time, stand at an impasse. It is unclear how the dynamical stance can handle representational thought, or how computationalism can deal effectively with a tightly coupled, reciprocally causative agent-environment system in continuous transformation. Underlying this dilemma is the complex relation of mind to time, a relation encoded in the word experience. We must ask if any hypothesis describes a (…)

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  106. Joy H. Roberts (1985). On Russell’s Rejection of Akoluthic Sensations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (June):595-600.

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  107. George J. Romanes (1878). Consciousness of Time. Mind 3 (11):297-303.

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  108. David M. Rosenthal (1992). Time and Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):220-221.

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  109. Eva Ruhnau (1995). Time Gestalt and the Observer. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh. pp. 165–184.

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  110. Henry Rutgers Marshall (1904). Of ‘Time Perception’. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (23):629-636.

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  111. John C. Sallis (1971). Time, Subjectivity, and the Phenomenology of Perception. Modern Schoolman 48 (May):343-358.

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  112. Laurie Mareta Sanda (2004). The Making of Art Through the Unfolding of Time. Dissertation, Texas Woman’s University
    The purpose of this interdisciplinary study is to investigate the temporal experience of artists during the conception and generation of artworks. ;The hybrid methodology of this qualitative study establishes a philosophical framework to integrate ideas from philosophy, psychology, physics, neurobiology, and the arts. Phenomenological language illustrates the philosophical line of reasoning throughout. ;Two composers, three choreographers, two visual artists, one novelist, and one fashion designer were interviewed through a series of open-ended questions. ;Chapter I initiates discussion of the ‘now’ moment (…)

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  113. Louis N. Sandowsky (2006). Hume and Husserl: The Problem of the Continuity or Temporalization of Consciousness. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (181):59-74.
    This paper examines Husserl’s fascination with the issues raised by Hume’s critique of the philosophy of the ego and the continuity of consciousness. The path taken here follows a continental and phenomenological approach. Husserl’s 1905 lecture course on the temporalization of immanent time-consciousness is a phenomenological-eidetic examination of how the continuity of consciousness and the consciousness of continuity are possible. It was by way of Husserl’s reading of Hume’s discussion of “flux” or “flow” that his discourse on temporal phenomena led (…)

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  114. John R. Searle (1956). Report on Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse? Analysis 16 (June):124.

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  115. Eliaz Segal (2004). The Mind’s Direction of Time. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (3):227-235.
    It seems that time has direction which points ahead from the past to the future. Traditionally, the main efforts to explain the arrow of time were carried out within the domain of physics, primarily utilizing statistical mechanics laws. Here, I attempt to explain how the forward direction of time is configured from the viewpoint of the mind. At first impression the concept of forward direction stems from the meeting of subjectivity with space and as such it is applied to time. (…)

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  116. Charles M. Sherover (1975). The Human Experience of Time: The Development of its Philosophic Meaning. Northwestern University Press.
    Updated, expanded, and with a new introduction by the editor, this volume is not only a historical overview but also a dialectical analysis displaying the …

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  117. Ernest Sosa (1983). Consciousness of Self and of the Present. In James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World. Hackett.

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  118. Stuart F. Spicker (1973). Inner Time and Lived-Through Time: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 4 (3):235-247.

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  119. Nikolai Ssorin‐Chaikov (2001). Evenki Shamanistic Practices in Soviet Present and Ethnographic Present Perfect. Anthropology of Consciousness 12 (1):1-18.

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  120. Robert C. Stalnaker (1981). Indexical Belief. Synthese 49 (1):129-151.

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  121. L. William Stern (2005). Mental Presence-Time. In The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy Volume 5, 2005, Burt Hopkins and Steven Crowell (Eds). Seattle: Noesis Press.

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  122. Ralph Strehle (2006). A Risky Business: Internal Time and Objective Time in Husserl and Woolf. In David Rudrum (ed.), Literature and Philosophy: A Guide to Contemporary Debates. Palgrave-Macmillan.

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  123. Jun Tani (2004). The Dynamical Systems Accounts for Phenomenology of Immanent Time: An Interpretation by Revisiting a Robotics Synthetic Study. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):5-24.
    This paper discusses possible correspondences between the dynamical systems characteristics observed in our previously proposed cognitive model and phenomenological accounts of immanent time considered by Edmund Husserl. Our simulation experiments in the anticiparatory learning of a robot showed that encountering sensory-motor flow can be learned as segmented into chunks of reusable primitives with accompanying dynamic shifting between coherences and incoherences in local modules. It is considered that the sense of objective time might appear when the continuous sensory-motor flow input to (…)

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  124. John Tasioulas (1998). Consequences of Ethical Relativism. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):156–171.

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  125. David L. Thompson, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness.
    Outline by Section: I. INTRODUCTION: METHOD OF PHENOMENOLOGY II. REDUCTION FROM DOGMAS III. EXAMPLES OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF A. SENTENCE B. MELODY C. DIAGRAM OF TIME IV. MODIFICATIONS AS MODES OF TEMPORAL STRUCTURE V. RETENTION VI. CONSTITUTION OF EXTERNAL TIME Time present and time past.

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  126. Louis L. Thurstone (1919). The Anticipatory Aspect of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (21):561-568.

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  127. Markos Valaris (2008). Inner Sense, Self-Affection, and Temporal Consciousness in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophers’ Imprint 8 (4):1-18.
    In §24 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant remarks that his account of the capacity of the understanding to spontaneously determine sensibility explains how empirical self-knowledge is possible through inner-sense. Although most commentators consider Kant’s conception of empirical self-knowledge through inner sense to be either a failure or at least drastically under-developed, I argue that (just as Kant claims) his account of the capacity of the understanding to determine sensibility – the “productive imagination” – can ground an attractive account of self-knowledge. (…)

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  128. Francisco J. Varela (1999). Present-Time Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):111-140.
    My purpose in this article is to propose an explicitly naturalized account of the experience of present nowness on the basis of two complementary sources: phenomenological analysis and cognitive neuroscience. What I mean by naturalization, and the role cognitive neuroscience plays will become clear as the paper unfolds, but the main intention is to use the consciousness of present time as a study case for the phenomenological framework presented by Depraz in this Special Issue.

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  129. Ram L. P. Vimal & Christopher J. Davia (2010). Phenomenal Time and its Biological Correlates. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (5):560-572.
    Our goal is to investigate the biological correlates of the first-person experience of time or phenomenal time. ‘Time’ differs in various domains, such as (i) physical time (e.g., clock time), (ii) biological time, such as the suprachiasmatic nucleus, and (iii) the perceptual rate of time. One psychophysical-measure of the perceptual rate is the critical flicker frequency (CFF), in which a flashing light is perceived as unchanging. Focusing on the inability to detect change, as in CFF, may give us insight into (…)

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  130. Mark Vorobej (1999). Promoting the Past. Philosophia 27 (3-4):523-534.

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  131. Mark Vorobej (1998). Past Desires. Philosophical Studies 90 (3):305-318.

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  132. Bernhard Waldenfels (2000). Time Lag: Motifs for a Phenomenology of the Experience of Time. Research in Phenomenology 30 (1):107-119.

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  133. Mary Ward (1926). Discussions: James Ward on Sense and Thought. Mind 35 (140):452-461.

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  134. J. H. Wearden (2001). Internal Clocks and the Representation of Time. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press. pp. 37–58.

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  135. Gal Yehezkel (2013). The Illusion of the Experience of the Passage of Time. Disputatio 5 (35):67-80.
    Supporters of the A-theory of time sometimes refer to an alleged experience of the passage of time in support of their theory. In this paper I argue that it is an illusion that we experience the passage of time, for such an experience is impossible. My argument relies on the general assertion that experience is contingent, in the sense that if it is possible to experience the passage of time, it is also possible to experience that time does not pass. (…)

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  136. Robert Young (1974). A Specious Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (2):268-270.

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  137. Dan Zahavi (2010). Inner (Time-)Consciousness. In D. Lohmar & I. Yamaguchi (eds.), On Time – New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time. Springer. pp. 319-339.
    In the introduction to Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Husserl remarks that “we get entangled in the most peculiar difficulties, contradictions, and confusions” (Hua X, 4) the moment we seek to account for time-consciousness. I think most scholars of Husserl’s writings on these issues would agree. Attempting to unravel the inner workings of time-consciousness can indeed easily induce a kind of intellectual vertigo. Let us consequently start with some of the basic questions that motivated Husserl’s inquiry.

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  138. Dan Zahavi (2007). Perception of Duration Presupposes Duration of Perception – or Does It? Husserl and Dainton on Time. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):453-471.
    In his recent book The Stream of Consciousness, Dainton provides what must surely count as one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-consciousness in analytical philosophy. In the course of doing so, he also challenges Husserl’s classical account in a number of ways. In the following contribution, I will compare Dainton’s and Husserl’s respective accounts. Such a comparison will not only make it evident why an analysis of time-consciousness is so important, but will also provide a neat opportunity to appraise (…)

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  139. Dan Zahavi (2004). Time and Consciousness in the Bernau Manuscripts. Husserl Studies 20 (2):99-118.
    Even a cursory glance in Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein makes it evident that one of Husserl’s major concerns in his 1917-18 reflections on time-consciousness was how to account for the constitution of time without giving rise to an infinite regress. Not only does Husserl constantly refer to this problem in Husserliana XXXIII – as he characteristically writes at one point “Überall drohen, scheint es, unendliche Regresse” – but he also takes care to distinguish between several different regresses. One (…)

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  140. Dan Zahavi (2003). Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore (…)

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  141. Dan Zahavi (ed.) (1998). Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Focusing on the topics of self-awareness, temporality, and alterity, this anthology contains contributions by prominent phenomenologists from Germany, Belgium, France, Japan, USA, Canada and Denmark, all addressing questions very much in the center of current phenomenological debate. What is the relation between the self and the Other? How are self-awareness and intentionality intertwined? To what extent do the temporality and corporeality of subjectivity contain a dimension of alterity? How should one account for the intersubjectivity, interculturality and historicity of the subject? (…)

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Experience of Temporal Passage
  1. Jan Almäng (2014). Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy. Husserl Studies 30 (1):1-19.
    A central topic in discussions about qualia concerns their purported transparency. According to transparency theorists, an experience is transparent in the sense that the subject having the experience is aware of nothing but the intended object of the experience. In this paper this notion is criticized for failing to account for the dynamical aspects of perception. A key assumption in the paper is that perceptual content has a certain temporal depth, in the sense that each act of perception can present (…)

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  2. Holly Andersen (forthcoming). The Hodgsonian Account of Temporal Experience. In Ian Phillips (ed.), Handbook of The Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge.
    This chapter offers a overview of Shadworth Hodgson’s account of experience as fundamentally temporal, an account that was deeply influential on thinkers such as William James and which prefigures the phenomenology of Husserl in many ways. I highlight eight key features that are characteristic of Hodgson’s account, and how they hang together to provide a coherent overall picture of experience and knowledge. Hodgson’s account is then compared to Husserl’s, and I argue that Hodgson’s account offers a better target for projects (…)

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  3. Holly Andersen (2014). The Development of the ‘Specious Present’ and James’ Views on Temporal Experience. In Dan Lloyd Valtteri Arstila (ed.), Subjective Time: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality. MIT Press. pp. 25-42.
    This chapter examines the philosophical discussion concerning the relationship between time, memory, attention, and consciousness, from Locke through the Scottish Common Sense tradition, in terms of its influence on James’ development of the specious present doctrine. The specious present doctrine is the view that the present moment in experience is non punctate, but instead comprises some nonzero amount of time; it contrasts with the mathematical view of the present, in which the divide between past and future is merely a point (…)

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  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (1974). Temporal Becoming: The Argument From Physics. Philosophical Forum 6 (2):218-236.
    Arguments about temporal becoming often get nowhere. One reason for the impasse lies in the fact that the issue has been formulated as a choice between science on the one hand and common sense (or ordinary language) on the other as the primary source of ontological commitment.’ Often’ proponents of attributing temporal becoming to the physical universe look to everyday temporal concepts, find them infested with notions involving temporal becoming and conclude that becoming is a basic feature of the physical (…)

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      18 citations  

  5. Adrian Bardon (2010). Time-Awareness and Projection in Mellor and Kant. Kant-Studien 101 (1):59-74.
    The theorist who denies the objective reality of non-relational temporal properties, or ‘A-series’ determinations, must explain our experience of the passage of time. D.H. Mellor, a prominent denier of the objective reality of temporal passage, draws, in part, on Kant in offering a theory according to which the experience of temporal passage is the result of the projection of change in belief. But Mellor has missed some important points Kant has to make about time-awareness. It turns out that Kant’s theory (…)

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  6. Adrian Bardon (2002). Temporal Passage and Kant’s Second Analogy. Ratio 15 (2):134–153.
    In this essay I address the question of the reality of temporal passage through a discussion of some of the implications of Kant’s reasoning concerning the necessary conditions of objective judgement. Some theorists have claimed that the attribution of non‐relational temporal properties to objects and events represents a conceptual confusion, or ‘category mistake’. By means of an examination of Kant’s Second Analogy, and a comparison between that argument and Cassam’s recent exploration of an argument regarding the necessity of the conceptualisation (…)

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  7. John C. Begg (1952). Time Order for Minds. Mind 61 (241):75-77.

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  8. Jiri Benovsky (2016). Endurance, Dualism, Temporal Passage, and Intuitions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):851-862.
    Endurantism, as opposed to perdurantism, is supposed to be the intuitive view. But the ‘endurantist intuition’ – roughly, that objects persist through time by being numerically identical and wholly located at all times at which they exist – is behind more than just endurantism. Indeed, it plays an important role in the motivation of some theories about the passage of time, and some theories about the nature of the subject. As we shall see, the endurantist intuition is often taken in (…)

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  9. Samuel K. K. Blankson (1997). Why Time is Not a Natural Phenomenon.

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  10. E. J. Bond (2005). Does the Subject of Experience Exist in the World? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):124-133.
    In this paper I attempt to show, by considering a number of sources, including Wittgenstein, Sartre, Thomas Nagel and Spinoza, but also adding something crucial of my own, that it is impossible to construe the subject of experience as an object among other objects in the world. My own added argument is the following. The subject of experience cannot move in time along with material events and processes or it could not be aware of the passage of time, hence neither (…)

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  11. Darren Bradley (2013). Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time. In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago.
    How should our beliefs change over time? Much has been written about how our beliefs should change in the light of new evidence. But that is not the question I’m asking. Sometimes our beliefs change without new evidence. I previously believed it was Sunday. I now believe it’s Monday. In this paper I discuss the implications of such beliefs for philosophy of language. I will argue that we need to allow for ‘dynamic’ beliefs, that we need new norms of belief (…)

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  12. John B. Brough (1992). Time and Experience. Review of Metaphysics 45 (3):622-623.

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  13. J. Butterfield (1984). Seeing the Present. Mind 93 (370):161-176.

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      8 citations  

  14. Ann Leone Clancy (1996). Toward a Holistic Concept of Time: Exploring the Link Between Internal and External Temporal Experiences. Dissertation, The Fielding Institute
    This study’s contribution to the philosophy and phenomenology of time lies in weaving the researcher’s intellectual and personal journey and struggles with time with her exploration of the theoretical and philosophical literature. Implications are drawn for the practice of organizational development with evidence presented of an emerging holistic concept of time in the field of organizational development. ;Historically, hermeneutics has arisen out of “gaps” which arise between different languages, times, levels, and even realms of existence and provides a way of (…)

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      1 citation  

  15. Jonathan Cohen (1954). The Experience of Time. Acta Psychologica 10:207-19.

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  16. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Full Report.
    This report highlights and explores four questions that arose from the workshop on temporal experience at the University of Toronto, May 20th and 21st, 2013.

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  17. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Question One.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What can we learn about the nature of time from the nature of ordinary experience?

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  18. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Question Two.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What is the relationship between time as represented in experience, the timing of the experiential act, and the timing of the neural realizer of the experience?

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  19. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Question Three.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What sorts of mechanisms underlie the perceived duration of external events?

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  20. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Question Four.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: Do we have one central clock for time, or different clocks for each sense modality?

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  21. William Lane Craig (2000). The Tensed Theory of Time : A Critical Examination. Kluwer Academic.
    In this book and the companion volume The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination, Craig undertakes the first thorough appraisal of the arguments for and against the tensed and tenseless theories of time.

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      32 citations  

  22. Benjamin L. Curtis (2015). Material Constitution, the Neuroscience of Consciousness, and the Temporality of Experience. In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory. pp. 433-444.
    In this paper I argue that if a completed neuroscience of consciousness is to be attained, we must give the synchronic and diachronic application conditions for brain states and phenomenal states. I argue that, due to the temporal nature of our experiences, such states must be viewed as being temporally extended events, and illustrate how to give such application conditions using examples of other temporally extended events. However, I also raise some difficulties for the project of giving application conditions for (…)

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  23. Barry Dainton (2011). Time, Passage and Immediate Experience. In Craig Callender (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. pp. 382.

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      6 citations  

  24. Mekhi Dhesi (2016). In Light of the Theory of Special Relativity is a Passage of Time and the Argument of the Presentist Untenable? Dissertation, University College London
    In light of the Special Theory of Relativity and the Minkowski creation of ‘spacetime’, the universe is taken to be a four-dimensional entity which postulates bodies as existing within a temporally extended reality. The Special Theory of Relativity’s implications liken the nature of the universe to a ‘block’ within which all events coexist equally in spacetime. Such a view strikes against the very essence of presentism, which holds that all that exists is the instantaneous state of objects in the present (…)

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  25. Yuval Dolev (1997). Time From the Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Viewpoints. Dissertation, Harvard University
    The idea that the present is “ontologically privileged” can be traced back to texts as early as St. Augustine’s Confessions and Aristotle’s Physics. The issue of the ontological status of tense continues to set the agenda in contemporary philosophy of time, which is dominated by two views. Proponents of the Tenseless View argue that all events are, in the timeless sense of ‘are’, equally real. Defenders of the rival Tensed View maintain that only present events are real, and that the (…)

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  26. Steven M. Duncan, In Defense of Temporal Passage.
    In this paper, I endorse and defend the Common Sense View of Time (CSVT), i.e. Presentism plus the A-theory of time, by arguing for the objective reality of temporal passage.

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  27. Eduardo Duque (2014). É possível sair do presente? Uma teoria prospetiva. In Emília Araújo, Eduardo Duque, Mónica Franch & José Durán (eds.), Tempos Sociais e o Mundo Contemporâneo – As crises, As Fases e as Ruturas. Centro de Estudos de Comunicação e Sociedade / Centro de Investigação em Ciências Sociais – UMinho. pp. 154-169.
    Nas sociedades antigas, o tempo era percecionado de forma cíclica, mítica, sem duração, em que se arranca o homem, tal como descreve Mircea Eliade (1969), em Le mythe de l’éternel retour, do seu tempo individual cronológico, histórico, projetando-o, pelo menos simbolicamente, em um grande tempo que não se pode mensurar porque não é constituído por uma duração. Nas sociedades modernas, o conceito de tempo passou a assumir outras conotações, ao ser entendido como sucessão e continuidade, desenhado de forma mais objetiva (…)

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  28. Arthur E. Falk (2003). Perceiving Temporal Passage. In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.

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  29. M. Oreste Fiocco (2014). Becoming: Temporal, Absolute, and Atemporal. In L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), Debates in the Metaphysics of Time. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 87-107.
    There are two conspicuous and inescapable features of this world in which time is real. One experiences a world in flux, a transient world in which things constantly come into existence, change and cease to be. One also experiences a stable world, one in which how things are at any given moment is permanent, unchangeable. Thus, there is transience and permanence. Yet these two features of the world seem incompatible. The primary purpose of this paper is to sketch a metaphysics (…)

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      1 citation  

  30. Paul Fitzgerald (1980). Is Temporality Mind-Dependent? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:283 – 291.
    A distinction is made between the indexicality theme and the elapsive theme. The first theme is concerned with the question of whether nowness and other irreducibly indexical A-determinations are mind-dependent or not. It is argued that there are no such A-determinations, within or outside of mind. The second, elapsive theme, which is often not distinguished from the first, deals with whether or not non-indexical felt transiency or elapsiveness is mind-dependent. Four arguments for the mind-dependence of “temporal becoming” are assessed as (…)

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  31. Akiko M. Frischhut (2013). The Experience of Temporal Passage. Dissertation, University of Geneva
    The project of my dissertation was to advance the metaphysical debate about temporal passage, by relating it to debates about the perceptual experience of time and change. It seems true that we experience temporal passage, even if there is disagreement whether time actually passes, or what temporal passage consists in. This appears to give the defender of dynamic time an advantage in accounting for our experience. I challenge this by arguing that no major account of temporal perception can accommodate experiences (…)

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  32. Akiko M. Frischhut (2013). What Experience Cannot Teach Us About Time. Topoi (1):1-13.
    Does the A-theory have an intuitive advantage over the B-theory? Many A-theorists have claimed so, arguing that their theory has a much better explanation for the fact that we all experience the passage of time: we experience time as passing because time really does pass. In this paper I expose and reject the argument behind the A-theorist’s claim. I argue that all parties have conceded far too easily that there is an experience that needs explaining in the first place. For (…)

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      1 citation  

  33. Walter Glannon (1994). Temporal Asymmetry, Life, and Death. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):235 – 244.

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  34. Enrico Grube (2014). Atomism and the Contents of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):13-33.
    Diachronic perceptual atomism is the view that the contents of experience do not involve temporal relations between non-simultaneous events, such as motion, succession, or duration, but only ‘snapshots’of the world. Traditionally, atomism has not been a very popular view. Indeed, many philosophers think that it is obviously false and that the main debate about time consciousness takes place between models which reject atomistic commitments. This antiatomistic sentiment can be traced back to William James’s (1890, p. 628) slogan that ‘a succession (…)

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  35. Ronald Gruber (2008). Neurophysics of the Flow of Time. Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (3):241-255.
    Three physical theories explaining the flow of time are examined. One theory suggests that “flow” is associated with the manner of information transfer between registers within the brain. Different robotic systems are predicted to experience different types of flow. Here, human examples are found to support the theory and the model is modified suggesting that flow is a cognitive illusion. A second theory suggests that time is non-existent, that the universe is a complex quantum state which, upon observation, the brain (…)

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  36. Ronald P. Gruber & Richard A. Block (2013). The Flow of Time as a Perceptual Illusion. Journal of Mind and Behavior 34 (1):91-100.

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  37. Rick Grush (2016). On the Temporal Character of Temporal Experience, its Scale Non-Invariance, and its Small Scale Structure.
    The nature of temporal experience is typically explained in one of a small number of ways, most are versions of either retentionalism or extensionalism. After describing these, I make a distinction between two kinds of temporal character that could structure temporal experience: A-ish contents are those that present events as structured in past/present/future terms, and B-ish contents are those that present events as structured in earlier-than/later-than/simultaneous-with relations. There are a few exceptions, but most of the literature ignores this distinction, and (…)

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  38. M. B. N. Hansen (2009). Living Technical Time: From Media Surrogacy to Distributed Cognition. Theory, Culture and Society 26 (2-3):294-315.
    This article proposes that time is not so much constituted by time-consciousness as given by technical inscriptions of time . The `digital gift’ of time that comprises one fundamental mode of this giving of time correlates with Aristotle’s conception of time as `the number of movement according to the before and after’; more specifically, it furnishes a minimal form of temporal difference — a minimal before-after structure — that proves useful for exploring how the experience of time has changed today. (…)

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  39. Klaus Held (2000). Generative Experience of Time. In John B. Brough (ed.), The Many Faces of Time. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. pp. 167–186.

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      1 citation  

  40. Laurence Herault (2006). Le Rite de Passage Et l’Expérience de « Changement de Sexe » : Van Gennep En Terre Transsexuelle. Hermes 43:169.

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  41. H. Scott Hestevold (1990). Passage and the Presence of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):537-552.

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      5 citations  

  42. R. E. Hicks, George W. Miller, G. Gaes & K. Bierman (1977). Concurrent Processing Demands and the Experience of Time-in-Passing. American Journal of Psychology 90:431-46.

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      4 citations  

  43. Christoph Hoerl (2014). Do We Perceive Passage? Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):188-202.
    I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived (…)

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      3 citations  

  44. Christoph Hoerl (2014). Time and the Domain of Consciousness. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1326:90-96.
    It is often thought that there is little that seems more obvious from experience than that time objectively passes, and that time is, in this respect, quite unlike space. Yet nothing in the physical picture of the world seems to correspond to the idea of such an objective passage of time. In this paper, I discuss some attempts to explain this apparent conflict between appearance and reality. I argue that existing attempts to explain the conflict as the result of a (…)

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      1 citation  

  45. Christoph Hoerl (2009). Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience. Philosophers’ Imprint 9 (12):1-18.
    We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as ‘before’ and ‘after’ (rather than, say, ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process that (…)

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      8 citations  

  46. Christoph Hoerl (1999). Memory, Amnesia, and the Past. Mind and Language 14 (2):227-51.
    This paper defends the claim that, in order to have a concept of time, subjects must have memories of particular events they once witnessed. Some patients with severe amnesia arguably still have a concept of time. Two possible explanations of their grasp of this concept are discussed. They take as their respective starting points abilities preserved in the patients in question: (1) the ability to retain factual information over time despite being unable to recall the past event or situation that (…)

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      4 citations  

  47. Dennis C. Holt (1981). Timelessness and the Metaphysics of Temporal Existence. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (2):149 – 156.

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  48. Ronald W. Houts (1980). Some Implications of the Time-Lag Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1/2):150-157.

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      2 citations  

  49. Nick Huggett (2014). Skeptical Notes on a Physics of Passage. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1326 (1):9-17.
    This paper investigates the mathematical representation of time in physics. In existing theories time is represented by the real numbers, hence their formal proper- ties represent properties of time: these are surveyed. The central question of the paper is whether the existing representation of time is adequate, or whether it can or should be supplemented: especially, do we need a physics incorporating some kind of ‘dynamical passage’ of time? The paper argues that the existing mathematical framework is resistant to such (…)

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  50. Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (2013). The Elusive Appearance of Time. In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag. pp. 5–304.
    It is widely assumed that time appears to be tensed, i.e. divided into a future, present and past, and transitory, i.e. involving some kind of ‘flow’ or ‘passage’ of times or events from the future into the present and away into the distant past. In this paper I provide some reasons to doubt that time appears to be tensed and transitory, or at least that philosophers who have suggested that time appears to be that way have included in ‘appearance’ everything (…)

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  51. Jenann Ismael, Memory.
    In the general project of trying to reconcile the subjective view of the world (how things seem from the perspective of the embedded agent) with the objective view (the view of the world from the outside, as represented, for example, in our best physics), analytic philosophy, especially in recent years, has been almost solely focused on sensory phenomenology.1 There are two very salient features of the subjective view that haven’t been explored even on the descriptive side but that present prima (…)

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  52. Stuart Jones (2012). Now? Towards a Phenomenology of Real Time Sonification. AI and Society 27 (2):223-231.
    The author examines concepts of real time and real-time in relation to notions of perception and processes of sonification. He explores these relationships in three case studies and suggests that sonification can offer a form of reconciliation between ontology and phenomenology, and between ourselves and the flux we are part of.

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  53. Sean D. Kelly (forthcoming). Time and Experience. In A. Brooks & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  54. Michal Klincewicz (2013). Time, Unity, and Conscious Experience. Dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center
    In my dissertation I critically survey existing theories of time consciousness, and draw on recent work in neuroscience and philosophy to develop an original theory. My view depends on a novel account of temporal perception based on the notion of temporal qualities, which are mental properties that are instantiated whenever we detect change in the environment. When we become aware of these temporal qualities in an appropriate way, our conscious experience will feature the distinct temporal phenomenology that is associated with (…)

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  55. Michal Klincewicz (2012). Neural Correlates of Temporality? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):704-706.

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  56. Maria Kon & Kristie Miller (2015). Temporal Experience: Models, Methodology and Empirical Evidence. Topoi 34 (1):201-216.
    This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An (…)

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  57. Uriah Kriegel (2009). Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):585-617.
    John Searle has argued that all perceptual experiences are token-reflexive, in the sense that they are constituents of their own veridicality conditions. Many philosophers have found the kind of token-reflexivity he attributes to experiences, which I will call _causal_ token-reflexivity, unfaithful to perceptual phenomenology. In this paper, I develop an argument for a different sort of token-reflexivity in perceptual (as well as some non- perceptual) experiences, which I will call _temporal_ token-reflexivity, and which ought to be phenomenologically unobjectionable.

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  58. Stephen Langfur (2016). The Interactive Now: A Second-Person Approach to Time-Consciousness. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 47 (2):156-182.
    Husserl offers insight into the constituting of the self-aware ego through time-consciousness. Yet his account does not satisfactorily explain how this ego can experience itself as presently acting. Furthermore, although he acknowledges that the Now is not a knife-edge present, he does not show what determines its duration. These shortfalls and others are overcome through a change of starting point. Citing empirical evidence, I take it as a basic given that when a caregiver frontally engages an infant of two months (…)

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  59. John W. Lango (2008). Time and Experience. In Michel Weber (ed.), Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought. De Gruyter. pp. 653-663.

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  60. Geoffrey Lee, Subjective Duration.

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  61. Geoffrey Lee (2016). Worlds, Voyages and Experiences: Commentary on Pelczar’s Sensorama. [REVIEW] Analysis 76 (4):453-461.

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  62. Geoffrey Lee (2014). Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience. Philosophers’ Imprint 14 (3).
    I assess a number of connected ideas about temporal experience that are introspectively plausible, but which I believe can be argued to be incorrect. These include the idea that temporal experiences are extended experiential processes, that they have an internal structure that in some way mirrors the structure of the apparent events they present, and the idea that time in experience is in some way represented by time itself. I explain how these ideas can be developed into more sharply defined (…)

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      3 citations  

  63. Pete Mandik, Slow Earth and the Slow-Switching Slowdown Showdown.
    The present paper has three aims. The first and foremost aim is to introduce into philosophy of mind and related areas (philosophy of language, etc) a discussion of Slow Earth, an analogue to the classic Twin Earth scenario that features a difference from aboriginal Earth that hinges on time instead of the distribution of natural kinds. The second aim is to use Slow Earth to call into question the central lessons often alleged to flow from consideration of Twin Earth, lessons (…)

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  64. Maurizio Mangiagalli (2009). Il Tempo: Fenomenologia E Metafisica. Aracne.

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  65. McGilvary Evander Bradley (1914). Time and the Experience of Time. Philosophical Review 23 (2):121-145.

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  66. John McTaggart (2014). A irrealidade do tempo. Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 55 (130):747-764.

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  67. B. Mölder, V. Arstila & P. Øhrstrøm (eds.) (2016). Philosophy and Psychology of Time. Springer.

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  68. Carlos Montemayor (2013). Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time. Brill.
    Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time offers an innovative philosophical account of the most fundamental kinds of time representation.

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      1 citation  

  69. J. M. Mozersky (2006). A Tenseless Account of the Presence of Experience. Philosophical Studies 129 (3):441-476.
    Tenseless theories of time entail that the only temporal properties exemplified by events are earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than. Such an account seems to conflict with our common experience of time, which suggests that the present moment is ontologically unique and that time flows. Some have argued that only a tensed account of time, one in which past, present and future are objective properties, can do justice to our experience. Any theory that claims that the world is different (…)

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  70. M. Joshua Mozersky (forthcoming). The B-Theory in the 20th Century. In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell.

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  71. Gregory Nixon (ed.) (2010). Time & Consciousness: Two Faces of One Mystery. QuantumDream.
    In what follows, I suggest that, against most theories of time, there really is an actual present, a now, but that such an eternal moment cannot be found before or after time. It may even be semantically incoherent to say that such an eternal present exists since “it” is changeless and formless (presumably a dynamic chaos without location or duration) yet with creative potential. Such a field of near-infinite potential energy could have had no beginning and will have no end, (…)

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  72. A. Noe (2006). Experience of the World in Time. Analysis 66 (1):26-32.

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  73. Alva Noë (2006). Experience of the World in Time. Analysis 66 (289):26–32.

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      9 citations  

  74. L. Nathan Oaklander (1993). On the Experience of Tenseless Time. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:159-166.
    Defending the tenseless theory of time requires dealing adequately with the experience of temporal becoming. The issue centers on whether the defender of tenseless time can provide an adequate analysis of the presence of experience and the appropriateness of certain of our attitudes toward future and past events. By responding to a recent article, ‘Passage and the Presenee of Experience’, by H . Scott Hestevold, I shall attempt to show that adequate analysis of tenseless time is possible.

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  75. Robert E. Ornstein (1969). On the Experience of Time. Harmondsworth.

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      16 citations  

  76. L. A. Paul (2014). Experience and the Arrow. In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry. pp. 175-193.
    The debate over the temporal arrow is a debate over what fundamental ontology is needed for the temporal asymmetry of the universe, which determines the fact that time seems to be oriented or directed from earlier to later. This temporal asymmetry underlies (or, as some might argue, is the same as) the asymmetrical fact that the past is fixed while the future is open, as well as the global asymmetries of counterfactual, causal and agential direction. I explore the metaphysics of (…)

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  77. L. A. Paul (2010). Temporal Experience. Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):333-359.
    The question I want to explore is whether experience supports an antireductionist ontology of time, that is, whether we should take it to support an ontology that includes a primitive, monadic property of nowness responsible for the special feel of events in the present, and a relation of passage that events instantiate in virtue of literally passing from the future, to the present, and then into the past.

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      25 citations  

  78. Michael Pelczar (forthcoming). Author’s Summary, and Replies to Commentators. [REVIEW] Analysis.

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  79. Simon Prosser (2016). Experiencing Time. Oxford University Press UK.
    Our engagement with time is a ubiquitous feature of our lives. We are aware of time on many scales, from the briefest flicker of change to the way our lives unfold over many years. But to what extent does this encounter reveal the true nature of temporal reality? To the extent that temporal reality is as it seems, how do we come to be aware of it? And to the extent that temporal reality is not as it seems, why does (…)

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  80. Simon Prosser (2013). Passage and Perception. Noûs 47 (1):69-84.
    I shall refer to all theories according to which time passes (including dynamic versions of presentism, ‘growing block’ theories, ‘shrinking tree’ theories, and so on) under the umbrella term ‘A-theory’, and I shall use the term ‘B-theory’ in the standard way to refer to the theory according to which time does not pass, and although events are ordered in time there is no objective present time.1 Many philosophers, both A- and B-theorists, have agreed that in experience we are, or at (…)

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      6 citations  

  81. Simon Prosser (2013). The Passage of Time. In Adrian Bardon Heather Dyke (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 315-327.
    This chapter discusses the notion that time passes, along with two major families of objections to this notion. The first kind of objection concerns the rate at which time passes; it has often been suggested that no coherent rate can be given. The alleged problems for the standard view, that time passes at one second per second, are discussed. A positive suggestion is then made for a way of making sense of the claim that time passes at one second per (…)

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  82. Simon Prosser (2012). Why Does Time Seem to Pass? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):92-116.
    According to the B-theory, the passage of time is an illusion. The B-theory therefore requires an explanation of this illusion before it can be regarded as fullysatisfactory; yet very few B-theorists have taken up the challenge of trying to provide one. In this paper I take some first steps toward such an explanation by first making a methodological proposal, then a hypothesis about a key element in the phenomenology of temporal passage. The methodological proposal focuses onthe representational content of the (…)

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      10 citations  

  83. Simon Prosser (2007). Could We Experience the Passage of Time? Ratio 20 (1):75-90.
    This is an expanded and revised discussion of the argument briefly put forward in my ‘A New Problem for the A-Theory of Time’, where it is claimed that it is impossible to experience real temporal passage and that no such phenomenon exists. In the first half of the paper the premises of the argument are discussed in more detail than before. In the second half responses are given to several possible objections, none of which were addressed in the earlier paper. (…)

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      8 citations  

  84. Simon Prosser (2000). A New Problem for the a-Theory of Time. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):494-498.
    : I offer a new approach to the increasingly convoluted debate between the A- and B-theories of time, the ‘tensed’ and ‘tenseless’ theories. It is often assumed that the B-theory faces more difficulties than the A-theory in explaining the apparently tensed features of temporal experience. I argue that the A-theory cannot explain these features at all, because on any physicalist or supervenience theory of the mind, in which the nature of experience is fixed by the physical state of the world, (…)

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      8 citations  

  85. Alexander R. Pruss (2000). Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future David Cockburn Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, Xiv + 355 Pp., $59.95. [REVIEW] Dialogue 39 (01):199-.

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  86. Oliver Rashbrook (2013). An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):584-610.
    A familiar slogan in the literature on temporal experience is that ‘a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession’. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumption I call the ‘Seems→Seemed’ claim. I then show that commitment to this assumption comes at a price: if we accept it, we either (…)

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      4 citations  

  87. Oliver Rashbrook (2013). Diachronic and Synchronic Unity. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):465-484.
    There are two different varieties of question concerning the unity of consciousness: questions about unity at a time, and unity over time. A recent trend in the debate about unity has been to attempt to provide a ‘generalized’ account that purports to solve both problems in the same way. This attempt can be seen in the accounts of Barry Dainton and Michael Tye. In this paper, I argue that there are crucial differences between unity over time and unity at a (…)

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  88. Oliver Rashbrook (2013). The Continuity of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):611-640.
    : In this paper I discuss two puzzles that concern the sense in which consciousness can be described as ‘continuous’. The first puzzle arises out of recent work by Dainton and Tye, both of whom appear to oscillate between ascribing the property of ‘continuity’ to the stream of experience, and ascribing it to the objects of experience. The second puzzle concerns the notion that the stream of consciousness could be in some sense unreal or illusory—a puzzle stemming from the thought (…)

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      2 citations  

  89. Oliver Rashbrook (2012). Broad’s Accounts of Temporal Experience. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (5).
    Two extremely detailed accounts of temporal experience can be found in the work of C. D. Broad. These accounts have been subject to considerable criticism. I argue that, when we look more carefully at Broad’s work, we find that much of this criticism fails to find its target. I show that the objection that ultimately proves troubling for Broad stems from his commitment to two principles: i) the Thin-PSA, and ii) the ‘Overlap’ claim. I use this result to demonstrate that (…)

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  90. David J. Schenk (2006). Heidegger’s B-Theoretic Phenomenology. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):219-233.
    In this paper I explain the basics of Heidegger’s early Daseinanalytik, an account that contains promising insights for the phenomenology of time. I then draw out some of the relevant lessons from his phenomenology for the debate between A-theorists andB-theorists in contemporary analytic philosophy of time, and I show how it is that he gives a more philosophically satisfying account of the phenomenological features of becoming than one generally finds in the analytic debate. In Heidegger’s theory, becoming is not some (…)

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  91. Mark Sharlow, From Brain to Cosmos (Preliminary Revised Edition).
    This is a draft for a revised edition of Mark Sharlow’s book “From Brain to Cosmos.” It includes most of the material from the first edition, two shorter pieces pertaining to the book, and a detailed new introduction.

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  92. Bradford Skow (2015). Objective Becoming. Oxford University Press UK.
    What does the passage of time consist in? There are some suggestive metaphors. âEvents approach us, pass us, and recede from us, like sticks and leaves floating on the river of time.â âWe are moving from the past into the future, like ships sailing into an unknown ocean.â There is surely something right and deep about these metaphors. But how close are they to the literal truth? In this book Bradford Skow argues that they are far from the literal truth. (…)

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      3 citations  

  93. Bradford Skow (2011). Experience and the Passage of Time. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):359-387.
    Some philosophers believe that the passage of time is a real phenomenon. And some of them find a reason to believe this when they attend to features of their conscious experience. In fact this “argument from experience” is supposed to be one of the main arguments for passage. What exactly does this argument look like? Is it any good?

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  94. Matthew Soteriou (2011). Occurrent Perceptual Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):485-504.

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      2 citations  

  95. Matthew Soteriou (2011). The Perception of Absence, Space, and Time. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press. pp. 181.
    This chapter discusses the causal requirements on perceptual success in putative cases of the perception of absence – in particular, in cases of hearing silence and seeing darkness. It is argued that the key to providing the right account of the respect in which we can perceive silence and darkness lies in providing the right account of the respect in which we can have conscious perceptual contact with intervals of time and regions of space within which objects can potentially be (…)

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      2 citations  

  96. Narve Strand (2000). The Paradox of the Present. Opuscula 2:39-55.

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  97. Jonathan Tallant (2013). Recent Work: Time. Analysis 73 (2):369-379.
    Recent work on time. There is, at present, a lot of varied and interesting work being done in the philosophy of time; too much for me to fully engage with all of it here. I will focus on three debates that have been particularly busy over the last few years: how do presentists ground true propositions about the past? How does time pass? How do we experience time’s passing?

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  98. Lane Timothy, Yeh Su-Ling, Tseng Phil & Chang An-Yi (2017). Timing Disownership Experiences in the Rubber Hand Illusion. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications 2 (4).
    Some investigators of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) have suggested that when standard RHI induction procedures are employed, if the rubber hand is experienced by participants as owned, their corresponding biological hands are experienced as disowned. Others have demurred: drawing upon a variety of experimental data and conceptual considerations, they infer that experience of the RHI might include the experience of a supernumerary limb, but that experienced disownership of biological hands does not occur. Indeed, some investigators even categorically deny that (…)

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  99. Vasilis Tsompanidis (2015). Explaining Tensed Belief. In K. Paykin-Arroučs & C. Majolino (eds.), Telling Time: Tensed and Temporal Meaning Between Philosophy and Linguistics. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 97-133.
    I attempt to set the stage for a constructive analysis of the nature and function of tensed belief as a distinct psychological type. After introducing tensed beliefs, I describe the philosophical issues that implicate them, including Prior’s “ thank goodness it’s over ” argument against the B-theory of time. I proceed to flesh out, and then argue against, two traditional treatments of tensed belief from the philosophy of time: the A-theoretic view, which starts from present facts or properties, and Hugh (…)

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  100. Vasilis Tsompanidis (2011). Tensed Belief. Dissertation, University of California Santa Barbara
    Human beings seem to capture time and the temporal properties of events and things in thought by having beliefs usually expressed with statements using tense, or notions such as ‘now’, ‘past’ or ‘future’. Tensed beliefs like these seem indispensable for correct reasoning and timely action. For instance, my belief that my root canal is over seems inexpressible with a statement that does not use tense or a temporal indexical. However, the dominant view on the nature of time is that it (…)

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  101. A. Ushenko (1934). The Date of a Temporal Perspective. Journal of Philosophy 31 (23):633-637.

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  102. Anderson Weekes (2009). Consciousness and Causation in Whitehead’s Phenomenology of Becoming. In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. aLBANY: State University of New York Press. pp. 407-461.
    The problem causation poses is: how can we ever know more than a Humean regularity. The problem consciousness poses is: how can subjective phenomenal experience arise from something lacking experience. A recent turn in the consciousness debates suggest that the hard problem of consciousness is nothing more than the Humean problem of explaining any causal nexus in an intelligible way. This involution of the problems invites comparison with the theories of Alfred North Whitehead, who also saw them related in this (…)

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  103. Clifford Williams (1992). The Phenomenology of B-Time. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):123-137.
    I argue that our experience of time supports the B-Theory of time and not the A-Theory of time. We do not experience pastness, presentness, and futurity as mind-independent properties of events. My method in supporting this experiential claim is to show that our experience of presentness is like our experience of hereness–in neither case are we aware of a mind-independent property over and above the events or objects to which we ascribe the presentness or hereness.

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  104. Gal Yehezkel (2013). The Illusion of the Experience of the Passage of Time. Disputatio 5 (35):67-80.
    Supporters of the A-theory of time sometimes refer to an alleged experience of the passage of time in support of their theory. In this paper I argue that it is an illusion that we experience the passage of time, for such an experience is impossible. My argument relies on the general assertion that experience is contingent, in the sense that if it is possible to experience the passage of time, it is also possible to experience that time does not pass. (…)

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      1 citation  

  105. Tomasz Żuradzki (2016). Time-Biases and Rationality: The Philosophical Perspectives on Empirical Research About Time Preferences. In Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Brożek & Łukasz Kurek (eds.), The Emergence of Normative Orders. Copernicus Press. pp. 149-187.
    The empirically documented fact is that people’s preferences are time -biased. The main aim of this paper is to analyse in which sense do time -biases violate the requirements of rationality, as many authors assume. I will demonstrate that contrary to many influential views in psychology, economy and philosophy it is very difficult to find why the bias toward the near violates the requirements rationality. I will also show why the bias toward the future violates the requirements of rationality in (…)

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The Specious Present
  1. L. E. Akeley (1925). The Problem of the Specious Present and Physical Time: The Problem Generalized. Journal of Philosophy 22 (21):561-573.

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  2. Holly Andersen (forthcoming). The Hodgsonian Account of Temporal Experience. In Ian Phillips (ed.), Handbook of The Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge.
    This chapter offers a overview of Shadworth Hodgson’s account of experience as fundamentally temporal, an account that was deeply influential on thinkers such as William James and which prefigures the phenomenology of Husserl in many ways. I highlight eight key features that are characteristic of Hodgson’s account, and how they hang together to provide a coherent overall picture of experience and knowledge. Hodgson’s account is then compared to Husserl’s, and I argue that Hodgson’s account offers a better target for projects (…)

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  3. Holly Andersen (2014). The Development of the ‘Specious Present’ and James’ Views on Temporal Experience. In Dan Lloyd Valtteri Arstila (ed.), Subjective Time: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality. MIT Press. pp. 25-42.
    This chapter examines the philosophical discussion concerning the relationship between time, memory, attention, and consciousness, from Locke through the Scottish Common Sense tradition, in terms of its influence on James’ development of the specious present doctrine. The specious present doctrine is the view that the present moment in experience is non punctate, but instead comprises some nonzero amount of time; it contrasts with the mathematical view of the present, in which the divide between past and future is merely a point (…)

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  4. Holly Andersen & Rick Grush (2009). A Brief History of Time-Consciousness: Historical Precursors to James and Husserl. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2):277-307.
    William James’ Principles of Psychology, in which he made famous the ‘specious present’ doctrine of temporal experience, and Edmund Husserl’s Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, were giant strides in the philosophical investigation of the temporality of experience. However, an important set of precursors to these works has not been adequately investigated. In this article, we undertake this investigation. Beginning with Reid’s essay ‘Memory’ in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, we trace out a line of development of ideas about (…)

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      4 citations  

  5. Jiri Benovsky (2013). The Present Vs. The Specious Present. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):193-203.
    This article is concerned with the alleged incompatibility between presentism and specious present theories of temporal experience. According to presentism, the present time is instantaneous (or, near-instantaneous), while according to specious present theories, the specious present is temporally extended—therefore, it seems that there is no room in reality for the whole of a specious present, if presentism is true. It seems then that one of the two claims—presentism or the specious present theory—has to go. I shall argue that this kind (…)

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  6. Jiri Benovsky (2012). The Speed of Thought. Experience of Change, Movement, and Time: A Lockean Account. Locke Studies 12:85-110.
    This paper is about our experience of change and movement, and thus about our experience of time – at least under the reasonable assumption that we (can only) experience time by having experiences of change. This assumption is shared by Locke, whose view on temporal experience, expounded in Book II, Chap.14 of his Essay, will be the main focal point of my paper. Some of the most influential accounts of temporal experience embrace the notion of a “specious present” as an (…)

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      1 citation  

  7. Gustav Bergmann (1960). Duration and the Specious Present. Philosophy of Science 27 (January):39-47.

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  8. Berit O. Brogaard (1999). Mead’s Temporal Realism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (3):563 – 593.

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  9. James McKeen Cattell (1886). The Time It Takes to See and Name Objects. Mind 11 (41):63-65.

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      8 citations  

  10. C. T. K. Chari (1951). Some Metaphysical Questions About the Doctrine of the ‘Specious Present’. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 23 (October):129-138.

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  11. Barry Dainton (2012). Self-Hood and the Flow of Experience. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):161-200.
    Analytic philosophy in the 20 th century was largely hostile territory to the self as traditionally conceived, and this tradition has been continued in two recent works: Mark Johnston’s Surviving Death , and Galen Strawson’s Selves . I have argued previously that it is perfectly possible to combine a naturalistic worldview with a conception of the self as a subject of experience , a thing whose only essential attribute is a capacity for unifi ed and continuous experience. I argue here (…)

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  12. Barry Dainton (2011). Time, Passage and Immediate Experience. In Craig Callender (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. pp. 382.

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      6 citations  

  13. Barry Dainton (2008). Sensing Change. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):362-384.
    We can anticipate what is yet to happen, remember what has already happened, but our immediate experience is confined to the present, the here and now. So much seems common sense. So much so that it is no surprise to see Thomas Reid, that pre-eminent champion of common sense in philosophy, advocating precisely this position.

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      10 citations  

  14. Barry Dainton (2008). The Experience of Time and Change. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):619-638.
    Can we directly experience change? Although some philosophers have denied it, the phenomenological evidence is unambiguous: we can, and do. But how is this possible? What structures or features of consciousness render such experience possible? A variety of very different answers to this question have been proposed, answers which have very different implications for the nature of consciousness itself. In this brief survey no attempt is made to engage with the often complex (and sometimes obscure) literature on this topic. Instead, (…)

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      9 citations  

  15. Barry Dainton (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge.
    _Stream of Consciousness_ is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness.

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  16. Barry F. Dainton (2004). Precis of Stream of Consciousness. Psyche 10 (1).
    That our ordinary everyday experience exhibits both unity and continuity is uncontroversial, and on the face of it utterly unmysterious. At any moment we have some conscious awareness of both the world about us, as revealed through our perceptual experiences, and our own inner states.

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  17. H. A. C. Dobbs (1951). The Relation Between the Time of Psychology and the Time of Physics Part I. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (6):122-141.
    THIS paper seeks to elucidate the phenomenon known in psychology as ‘the specious present,’ by postulating a two-dimensional theory of the extensional aspects of time. On this theory, the usual logical and psychological difficulties, encountered in current accounts of this phenomenon, can be resolved. For, when there are two dimensions of time, the same event may be without extension in one of these dimensions (‘transition-time’), while it is nevertheless finitely extended in the other of these dimensions (‘phase-time’); so that in (…)

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      1 citation  

  18. Patrick K. Dooley (2006). William James’s “Specious Present” and Willa Cather’s Phenomenology of Memory. Philosophy Today 50 (5):444-449.

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  19. Steven M. Duncan, The Present.
    While the nature of the past and the future have received a lot of attention from recent analytic philosophers, the present has been somewhat neglected. I think the notion of the present is somewhat misunderstood and hope to rectify some of those misunderstandings in this essay. It is high time that this was done. Let’s do it now!

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  20. Knight Dunlap (1911). Rhythm and the Specious Present. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 8 (13):348-354.

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  21. Eduardo Duque (2014). É possível sair do presente? Uma teoria prospetiva. In Emília Araújo, Eduardo Duque, Mónica Franch & José Durán (eds.), Tempos Sociais e o Mundo Contemporâneo – As crises, As Fases e as Ruturas. Centro de Estudos de Comunicação e Sociedade / Centro de Investigação em Ciências Sociais – UMinho. pp. 154-169.
    Nas sociedades antigas, o tempo era percecionado de forma cíclica, mítica, sem duração, em que se arranca o homem, tal como descreve Mircea Eliade (1969), em Le mythe de l’éternel retour, do seu tempo individual cronológico, histórico, projetando-o, pelo menos simbolicamente, em um grande tempo que não se pode mensurar porque não é constituído por uma duração. Nas sociedades modernas, o conceito de tempo passou a assumir outras conotações, ao ser entendido como sucessão e continuidade, desenhado de forma mais objetiva (…)

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  22. Richard M. Gale (1997). From the Specious to the Suspicious Present: The Jack Horner Phenomenology of William James. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 11 (3):163-189.

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  23. Shaun Gallagher (2003). Sync-Ing in the Stream of Experience: Time-Consciousness in Broad, Husserl, and Dainton. Psyche 9 (10).
    By examining Dainton’s account of the temporality of consciousness in the context of long-running debates about the specious present and time consciousness in both the Jamesian and the phenomenological traditions, I raise critical objections to his overlap model. Dainton’s interpretations of Broad and Husserl are both insightful and problematic. In addition, there are unresolved problems in Dainton’s own analysis of conscious experience. These problems involve ongoing content, lingering content, and a lack of phenomenological clarity concerning the central concept of overlapping (…)

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      12 citations  

  24. John R. Gregg, Time Consciousness and the Specious Present.
    Roger Penrose, in _The Emperor’s New Mind_ (1989), writes about the way Mozart perceived music. Mozart did not play a piece in his mind in real time, or even speeded up, but could hold it before him all at once. We all do this, although usually for much shorter riffs than entire symphonies. I have argued that the all-at-onceness of our thoughts and perceptions is at least as inexplicable as what it is like to see red; I think the aural/temporal (…)

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  25. Rick Grush (2016). On the Temporal Character of Temporal Experience, its Scale Non-Invariance, and its Small Scale Structure.
    The nature of temporal experience is typically explained in one of a small number of ways, most are versions of either retentionalism or extensionalism. After describing these, I make a distinction between two kinds of temporal character that could structure temporal experience: A-ish contents are those that present events as structured in past/present/future terms, and B-ish contents are those that present events as structured in earlier-than/later-than/simultaneous-with relations. There are a few exceptions, but most of the literature ignores this distinction, and (…)

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  26. Christoph Hoerl (2013). ‘A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession’. Mind 122 (486):373-417.
    Variants of the slogan that a succession of experiences does not amount to an experience of succession are commonplace in the philosophical literature on temporal experience. I distinguish three quite different arguments that might be captured using this slogan: the individuation argument, the unity argument, and the causal argument. Versions of the unity and the causal argument are often invoked in support of a particular view of the nature of temporal experience sometimes called intentionalism, and against a rival view sometimes (…)

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      3 citations  

  27. Christoph Hoerl (2013). Husserl, the Absolute Flow, and Temporal Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):376-411.
    The notion of the absolute time-constituting flow plays a central role in Edmund Husserl’s analysis of our consciousness of time. I offer a novel reading of Husserl’s remarks on the absolute flow, on which Husserl can be seen to be grappling with two key intuitions that are still at the centre of current debates about temporal experience. One of them is encapsulated by what is sometimes referred to as an intentionalist (as opposed to an extensionalist) approach to temporal experience. The (…)

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  28. Christoph Hoerl (2009). Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience. Philosophers’ Imprint 9 (12):1-18.
    We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as ‘before’ and ‘after’ (rather than, say, ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process that (…)

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      8 citations  

  29. Jakob Hohwy, Bryan Paton & Colin Palmer (2016). Distrusting the Present. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):315-335.
    We use the hierarchical nature of Bayesian perceptual inference to explain a fundamental aspect of the temporality of experience, namely the phenomenology of temporal flow. The explanation says that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception stems from probabilistic inference that the present cannot be trusted. The account begins by describing hierarchical inference under the notion of prediction error minimization, and exemplifies distrust of the present within bistable visual perception and action initiation. Distrust of the present is then discussed (…)

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  30. Edmund G. Husserl (1991). On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Translated by John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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  31. William James (1886). The Perception of Time. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 20 (4):374 – 407.

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      1 citation  

  32. Sean D. Kelly (forthcoming). Time and Experience. In A. Brooks & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  33. Sean D. Kelly (2005). Temporal Awareness. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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      4 citations  

  34. Sean D. Kelly (2005). The Puzzle of Temporal Experience. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 208–238.
    There you are at the opera house. The soprano has just hit her high note – a glassshattering high C that fills the hall – and she holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds the note for such a long time that after a while a funny thing happens: you no longer seem only to hear it, the note as it is currently sounding, that glass-shattering high C that is loud and (…)

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      10 citations  

  35. Julian Kiverstein (2010). Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):155-181.
    Our perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience must (…)

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  36. Maria Kon & Kristie Miller (2015). Temporal Experience: Models, Methodology and Empirical Evidence. Topoi 34 (1):201-216.
    This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An (…)

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  37. Laurence J. Lafleur (1942). The Specious Present. Personalist 23 (4):407-415.

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  38. Geoffrey Lee (2014). Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience. Philosophers’ Imprint 14 (3).
    I assess a number of connected ideas about temporal experience that are introspectively plausible, but which I believe can be argued to be incorrect. These include the idea that temporal experiences are extended experiential processes, that they have an internal structure that in some way mirrors the structure of the apparent events they present, and the idea that time in experience is in some way represented by time itself. I explain how these ideas can be developed into more sharply defined (…)

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  39. J. D. Mabbott (1955). The Specious Present. Mind 64 (July):376-383.

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  40. J. D. Mabbott (1951). Our Direct Experience of Time. Mind 60 (April):153-167.

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      4 citations  

  41. McGilvary Evander Bradley (1914). Time and the Experience of Time. Philosophical Review 23 (2):121-145.

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  42. Neil McKinnon (2003). Presentism and Consciousness. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):305-323.
    The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced.

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  43. B. Mölder, V. Arstila & P. Øhrstrøm (eds.) (2016). Philosophy and Psychology of Time. Springer.

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  44. William James Quotes Mozart, Time Consciousness and the Specious Present.
    . . . and I spread it out broader and clearer, and at last it gets almost finished in my head, even when it is a long piece, so that I can see the whole of it at a single glance in my mind, as if it were a beautiful painting of a handsome human being; in which way I do not hear it in my imagination at all as a succession – the way it must come later – but (…)

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  45. Clement W. K. Mundle (1954). How Specious is the ‘Specious Present’? Mind 63 (January):26-48.

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  46. Gerald E. Myers (1971). William James on Time Perception. Philosophy of Science 38 (September):353-360.
    James argued that time is a sensation, and the main point of this paper is to deny that claim. The concept of the specious present is explained, indicating how it clarifies the concept of “the present moment.” But neither it nor an argument used by Mach and James show time to be a sensation. The analysis presented here requires distinguishing concepts of sensation from concepts of temporal relations. James’ view is really a theory that time-as-duration is sensed. But this assumes (…)

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  47. Thomas Natsoulas (1993). The Stream of Consciousness: William James’s Specious Present. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 12:367-385.

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  48. L. Nathan Oaklander (2001). The Importance of Time (Philosophical Studies Series). In Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society, 1995-2000. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
    The Importance of Time is a unique work that reveals the central role of the philosophy of time in major areas of philosophy. The first part of the book consists of symposia on two of the most important works in the philosophy of time over the past decade: Michael Tooley’s Time, Tense, and Causation and D.H. Mellor’s Real Time II. What characterizes these essays, and those that follow, are the interchanges between original papers, with original responses to them by commentators. (…)

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  49. Ian Phillips (2010). Perceiving Temporal Properties. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):176-202.
    Philosophers have long struggled to understand our perceptual experience of temporal properties such as succession, persistence and change. Indeed, strikingly, a number have felt compelled to deny that we enjoy such experience. Philosophical puzzlement arises as a consequence of assuming that, if one experiences succession or temporal structure at all, then one experiences it at a moment. The two leading types of theory of temporal awareness—specious present theories and memory theories—are best understood as attempts to explain how temporal awareness is (…)

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  50. Ian Phillips (2009). Experience and Time. Dissertation, UCL
    We are no less directly acquainted with the temporal structure of the world than with its spatial structure. We hear one word succeeding another; feel two taps as simultaneous; or see the glow of a firework persisting, before it finally fizzles and fades. However, time is special, for we not only experience temporal properties; experience itself is structured in time. -/- Part One articulates a natural framework for thinking about experience in time. I claim (i) that experience in its experiential (…)

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      3 citations  

  51. Gilbert Plumer (1985). The Myth of the Specious Present. Mind 94 (373):19-35.
    The doctrine of the specious present holds that sensation at an instant encompasses objects as they are over an interval. Now there actually is intersubjective agreement with respect to past, present, and future determinations, and it is a necessary condition for legitimately postulating them as objective. I argue that the specious present doctrine would make this actuality an impossibility, and that the data on which the doctrine is based do not in fact support it.

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  52. Gilbert Edward Plumer (1983). Now. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
    The dissertation is a study primarily in analytic metaphysics. The emphasis is on time, and the focus, on the whole, is on the notion of Now. In the first chapter I consider Now as it figures in singular demonstrative reference by giving an exposition and partially Kantian refutation of Hegel’s argument that such reference is impossible. The ability to so-refer is the ability to mean and express ‘this’, i.e., what is here and now to me. Hegel’s central mistake was to (…)

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  53. Susan Pockett (2003). How Long is Now? Phenomenology and the Specious Present. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):55-68.
    The duration of “now” is shown to be important not only for an understanding of how conscious beings sense duration, but also for the validity of the phenomenological enterprise as Husserl conceived it. If “now” is too short, experiences can not be described before they become memories, which can be considered to be transcendent rather than immanent phenomena and therefore inadmissible as phenomenological data. Evidence concerning (a) the objective duration of sensations in various sensory modalities, (b) the time necessary for (…)

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  54. Sean Enda Power (2016). Relative and Absolute Presence. In B. Mölder, V. Arstila & P. Øhrstrøm (eds.), Philosophy and Psychology of Time. Springer. pp. 69-100.
    Different ways of thinking about presence can have significant consequences for one’s thinking about temporal experience. Temporal presence can be conceived of as either absolute or relative. Relative presence is analogous to spatial presence, whereas absolute presence is not. For each of these concepts of presence, there is a theory of time which holds that this is how presence really is. For the A-theory, temporal presence is absolute; it is a special moment in time, a time defined by events in (…)

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  55. Sean Enda Power (2012). The Metaphysics of the ‘Specious’ Present. Erkenntnis 77 (1):121-132.
    The doctrine of the specious present, that we perceive or, at least, seem to perceive a period of time is often taken to be an obvious claim about perception. Yet, it also seems just as commonly rejected as being incoherent. In this paper, following a distinction between three conceptions of the specious present, it is argued that the incoherence is due to hidden metaphysical assumptions about perception and time. It is argued that for those who do not hold such assumptions, (…)

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  56. Sean Enda Power (2010). Complex Experience, Relativity and Abandoning Simultaneity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):231-256.
    Starting from the special theory of relativity it is argued that the structure of an experience is extended over time, making experience dynamic rather than static. The paper describes and explains what is meant by phenomenal parts and outlines opposing positions on the experience of time. Time according to he special theory of relativity is defined and the possibility of static experience shown to be implausible, leading to the conclusion that experience is dynamic. Some implications of this for the relationship (…)

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  57. Simon Prosser (2016). Experiencing Time. Oxford University Press UK.
    Our engagement with time is a ubiquitous feature of our lives. We are aware of time on many scales, from the briefest flicker of change to the way our lives unfold over many years. But to what extent does this encounter reveal the true nature of temporal reality? To the extent that temporal reality is as it seems, how do we come to be aware of it? And to the extent that temporal reality is not as it seems, why does (…)

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  58. Oliver Rashbrook (2013). The Continuity of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):611-640.
    : In this paper I discuss two puzzles that concern the sense in which consciousness can be described as ‘continuous’. The first puzzle arises out of recent work by Dainton and Tye, both of whom appear to oscillate between ascribing the property of ‘continuity’ to the stream of experience, and ascribing it to the objects of experience. The second puzzle concerns the notion that the stream of consciousness could be in some sense unreal or illusory—a puzzle stemming from the thought (…)

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  59. Oliver Rashbrook (2012). Broad’s Accounts of Temporal Experience. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (5).
    Two extremely detailed accounts of temporal experience can be found in the work of C. D. Broad. These accounts have been subject to considerable criticism. I argue that, when we look more carefully at Broad’s work, we find that much of this criticism fails to find its target. I show that the objection that ultimately proves troubling for Broad stems from his commitment to two principles: i) the Thin-PSA, and ii) the ‘Overlap’ claim. I use this result to demonstrate that (…)

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  60. E. M. Rubenstein (2000). Experiencing the Future: Kantian Thoughts on Husserl. Idealistic Studies 30 (1):61-77.

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  61. Bertrand Russell (1915). On the Experience of Time. The Monist 25 (2):212-233.

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  62. Francisco Varela (1999). The Specious Present: A Neurophenomenology of Time Consciousness. In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press. pp. 266–314.

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  63. Stephen F. Walker (1990). Specious Comparisons Versus Comparative Epistemology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (2):394-395.

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Temporal Experience, Misc
  1. Bruce Ackerman (1997). Temporal Horizons of Justice. Journal of Philosophy 94 (6):299.

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  2. Virgil C. Aldrich (1975). Picturing, Seeing and the Time-Lag Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):535 – 547.

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  3. Jan Almäng (2013). Two Kinds of Time-Consciousness and Three Kinds of Content. Axiomathes 23 (1):61-80.
    This paper explores the distinction between perceiving an object as extended in time, and experiencing a sequence of perceptions. I argue that this distinction cannot be adequately described by any present theory of time-consciousness and that in order to solve the puzzle, we need to consider perceptual content as having three distinct constituents: Explicit content, which has a particular phenomenal character, modal content, or the kind of content that is contributed by the psychological mode, and implicit content, which lacks phenomenal (…)

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  4. Holly Andersen (forthcoming). The Hodgsonian Account of Temporal Experience. In Ian Phillips (ed.), Handbook of The Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge.
    This chapter offers a overview of Shadworth Hodgson’s account of experience as fundamentally temporal, an account that was deeply influential on thinkers such as William James and which prefigures the phenomenology of Husserl in many ways. I highlight eight key features that are characteristic of Hodgson’s account, and how they hang together to provide a coherent overall picture of experience and knowledge. Hodgson’s account is then compared to Husserl’s, and I argue that Hodgson’s account offers a better target for projects (…)

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  5. Holly Andersen & Rick Grush (2009). A Brief History of Time-Consciousness: Historical Precursors to James and Husserl. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2):277-307.
    William James’ Principles of Psychology, in which he made famous the ‘specious present’ doctrine of temporal experience, and Edmund Husserl’s Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, were giant strides in the philosophical investigation of the temporality of experience. However, an important set of precursors to these works has not been adequately investigated. In this article, we undertake this investigation. Beginning with Reid’s essay ‘Memory’ in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, we trace out a line of development of ideas about (…)

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  6. Michael L. Anderson, Time-Situated Agency: Active Logic and Intention Formation.
    In recent years, embodied cognitive agents have become a central research focus in Cognitive Science. We suggest that there are at least three aspects of embodiment| physical, social and temporal|which must be treated simultaneously to make possible a realistic implementation of agency. In this paper we detail the ways in which attention to the temporal embodiment of a cognitive agent (perhaps the most neglected aspect of embodiment) can enhance the ability of an agent to act in the world, both in (…)

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  7. Michael V. Antony (2001). On the Temporal Boundaries of Simple Experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):263-286.
    I have argued elsewhere that our conception of phenomenal consciousness commits us to simple phenomenal experiences that in some sense constitute our complex experiences. In this paper I argue that the temporal boundaries of simple phenomenal experiences cannot be conceived as fuzzy or vague, but must be conceived as instantaneous or maximally sharp. The argument is based on an account of what is involved in conceiving fuzzy temporally boundaries for events generally. If the argument is right, and our conception of (…)

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  8. Valtteri Arstila (2016). Theories of Apparent Motion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):337-358.
    Apparent motion is an illusion in which two sequentially presented and spatially separated stimuli give rise to the experience of one moving stimulus. This phenomenon has been deployed in various philosophical arguments for and against various theories of consciousness, time consciousness and the ontology of time. Nevertheless, philosophers have continued working within a framework that does not reflect the current understanding of apparent motion. The main objectives of this paper are to expose the shortcomings of the explanations provided for apparent (…)

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  9. Valtteri Arstila (2015). Keeping Postdiction Simple. Consciousness and Cognition 38:205-216.
    abstract Postdiction effects are phenomena in which a stimulus influences the appearance of events taking place before it. In metacontrast masking, for instance, a masking stimulus can ren- der a target stimulus shown before the mask invisible. This and other postdiction effects have been considered incompatible with a simple explanation according to which (i) our perceptual experiences are delayed for only the time it takes for a distal stimulus to reach our sensory receptors and for our neural mechanisms to process (…)

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  10. Adrian Bardon (2007). Empiricism, Time-Awareness, and Hume’s Manners of Disposition. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (1):47-63.
    The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? A unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume’s comments on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other empiricist accounts. Hume’s theory, however, has some counter-intuitive consequences. The failure of empiricists to come up with a defensible theory of time-awareness lends prima facie support to a non-empiricist theory of ideas.

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  11. F. C. Bartlett (1937). Some Problems in the Psychology of Temporal Perception. Philosophy 12 (48):457 – 465.
    Perhaps it is unfortunate that, no matter what problems a psychological investigator elects to attempt to discuss, he is almost always confronted by a number of different and often conflicting points of view. The twisting paths revealed by these may one day be found to unite into a broad road, but most of them have as yet been insufficiently explored. Certainly problems in the psychology of temporal perception seem to lie in many different directions, according to the ways in which (…)

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  12. Jonathan Bennett (2004). Time in Human Experience. Philosophy 79 (308):165-183.
    A set of eight mini-discourses. 1. The conceivability of the physical world’s running in the opposite temporal direction. 2. Augustine’s reason for thinking this is not conceivable for the world of the mind. 3. Trying to imagine being a creature that lives atemporally. 4. Memory’s need for causal input. 5. Acting in the knowledge that how one acts is strictly determined. 6. The Newcomb problem. 7. The idea that all voluntary action is intended to be remedial. 8. Haunted by the (…)

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  13. Jiri Benovsky (2016). Endurance, Dualism, Temporal Passage, and Intuitions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):851-862.
    Endurantism, as opposed to perdurantism, is supposed to be the intuitive view. But the ‘endurantist intuition’ – roughly, that objects persist through time by being numerically identical and wholly located at all times at which they exist – is behind more than just endurantism. Indeed, it plays an important role in the motivation of some theories about the passage of time, and some theories about the nature of the subject. As we shall see, the endurantist intuition is often taken in (…)

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  14. Alexandre Billon (2016). Making Sense of the Cotard Syndrome: Insights From the Study of Depersonalisation. Mind and Language 31 (3):356-391.
    Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they (…)

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  15. Martha Blassnigg (2010). Revisiting Marey’s Applications of Scientific Moving Image Technologies in the Context of Bergson’s Philosophy: Audio-Visual Mediation and the Experience of Time. [REVIEW]Medicine Studies 2 (3):175-184.
    This paper revisits some early applications of audio-visual imaging technologies used in physiology in a dialogue with reflections on Henri Bergson’s philosophy. It focuses on the aspects of time and memory in relation to spatial representations of movement measurements and critically discusses them from the perspective of the observing participant and the public exhibitions of scientific films. Departing from an audio-visual example, this paper is informed by a thick description of the philosophical implications and contemporary discourses surrounding the scientific inventions, (…)

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  16. David O. Brink (2011). Prospects for Temporal Neutrality. In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press.

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      1 citation  

  17. David O. Brink (2003). Prudence and Authenticity: Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value. Philosophical Review 112 (2):215-245.
    Prudence and authenticity are sometimes seen as rival virtues. Prudence,as traditionally conceived, is temporally neutral. It attaches no intrinsic significance to the temporal location of benefits or harms within the agent’s life; the prudent agent should be equally concerned about all parts of her life. But people’s values and ideals often change over time, sometimes in predictable ways, as when middle age and parenthood often temporize youthful radicalism or spontaneity with concerns for comfort,security, and predictability. In situations involving diachronic, intrapersonal (…)

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      7 citations  

  18. J. Brown (2000). Against Temporal Externalism. Analysis 60 (2):178-188.

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      1 citation  

  19. Jeremy Butterfield (ed.) (1999). The Arguments of Time. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press.
    These nine essays address fundamental questions about time in philosophy, physics, linguistics, and psychology. Are there facts about the future? Could we affect the past? In physics, general relativity and quantum theory give contradictory treatments of time. So in the current search for a theory of quantum gravity, which should give way: general relativity or quantum theory? In linguistics and psychology, how does our language represent time, and how do our minds keep track of it?

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      6 citations  

  20. Cattell James McKeen (1886). The Time Taken Up by Cerebral Operations. Mind 11 (42):220-242.

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      3 citations  

  21. James McKeen Cattell (1886). The Time It Takes to See and Name Objects. Mind 11 (41):63-65.

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      8 citations  

  22. Peter Caws (1965). On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1):63 – 66.

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  23. M. Chatterjee (1971). Towards a Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness in Music. Diogenes 19 (74):49-56.

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  24. Andy Clark (1998). Time and Mind. Journal of Philosophy 95 (7):354.
    Mind, it has recently been argued1, is a thoroughly temporal phenomenon: so temporal, indeed, as to defy description and analysis using the traditional computational tools of cognitive scientific understanding. The proper explanatory tools, so the suggestion goes, are instead the geometric constructs and differential equations of Dynamical Systems Theory. I consider various aspects of the putative temporal challenge to computational understanding, and show that the root problem turns on the presence of a certain kind of causal web: a web that (…)

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  25. David Cockburn (2010). Time in Consciousness, Consciousness in Time. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):183-201.
    The paper is a criticism of the idea that a notion of has a significant role to play in the attempt to understand how the experience of change is possible. Discussion of such experience must give a significant place to its public and private manifestations. How should we picture the relationship between the experience of change and its manifestations? While we cannot identify these, we need not conclude that is something distinct from any of its public or private manifestations. With (…)

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  26. Barry Dainton, Temporal Consciousness.
    In ordinary conscious experience, consciousness of time seems to be ubiquitous. For example, we seem to be directly aware of change, movement, and succession across brief temporal intervals. How is this possible? Many different models of temporal consciousness have been proposed. Some philosophers have argued that consciousness is confined to a momentary interval and that we are not in fact directly aware of change. Others have argued that although consciousness itself is momentary, we are nevertheless conscious of change. Still others (…)

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  27. Bernard P. Dauenhauer (1969). Making Plans and Lived Time. Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):83-90.

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  28. Daniel C. Dennett (1995). Is Perception the “Leading Edge” of Memory? In A. Spafadora (ed.), Iride: Luoghi Della Memoria E Dell’oblio.
    Daniel C. Dennett Is Perception the ‘Leading Edge’ of Memory? Consciousness appears to us to consist of a sequence of contentful items, arranged in a sequence, the so-called “stream of consciousness,” in which each item in turn bursts quite suddenly into consciousness and thereby enters memory, perhaps only briefly to be remembered, and then forgotten. I think that hidden in this comfortable and largely innocent picture of consciousness is a deep and seductive mistake. I intend to expose and elucidate that (…)

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  29. Daniel C. Dennett (1992). Temporal Anomalies of Consciousness. In Y. Christen & P.S. Churchland (eds.), Neurophilosophy and Alzheimer’s Disease. Springer Verlag. pp. 5–17.
    As cognitive science, including especially cognitive neuroscience, closes in on the first realistic models of the human mind, philosophical puzzles and problems that have been conveniently postponed or ignored for generations are beginning to haunt the efforts of the scientists, confounding their vision and leading them down hopeless paths of theory. I will illustrate this claim with a brief look at several temporal phenomena which appear anomalous only because of a cognitive illusion: an illusion about the point of view of (…)

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  30. Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher’s Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.

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      24 citations  

  31. Daniel C. Dennett & Kinsbourne Marcel (1992). Time and the Observer. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    Two models of consciousness are contrasted with regard to their treatment of subjective timing. The standard Cartesian Theater model postulates a place in the brain where “it all comes together”: where the discriminations in all modalities are somehow put into registration and “presented” for subjective judgment. In particular, the Cartesian Theater model implies that the temporal properties of the content-bearing events occurring within this privileged representational medium determine subjective order. The alternative, Multiple Drafts model holds that whereas the brain events (…)

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      14 citations  

  32. Fred I. Dretske (1962). Moving Backward in Time. Philosophical Review 71 (1):94-98.

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  33. Nicolas Drouhin (2001). Lifetime Uncertainty and Time Preference. Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):145-172.
    Despite Fisher’s (1930) psychological intuitions of and the formal treatment given by Yaari (1965, Review of Economic Studies 32, 137), the intertemporal model of choice is mainly a model with certain lifetime. The purpose of this paper is to reconsider this assumption, starting from a very simple two-period model of choice with lifetime uncertainty. We examine the comparative statics of the model at the first two orders and replace the concept of `pure time preference’ by taking into account the subjective (…)

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  34. Eduardo Duque (2014). É possível sair do presente? Uma teoria prospetiva. In Emília Araújo, Eduardo Duque, Mónica Franch & José Durán (eds.), Tempos Sociais e o Mundo Contemporâneo – As crises, As Fases e as Ruturas. Centro de Estudos de Comunicação e Sociedade / Centro de Investigação em Ciências Sociais – UMinho. pp. 154-169.
    Nas sociedades antigas, o tempo era percecionado de forma cíclica, mítica, sem duração, em que se arranca o homem, tal como descreve Mircea Eliade (1969), em Le mythe de l’éternel retour, do seu tempo individual cronológico, histórico, projetando-o, pelo menos simbolicamente, em um grande tempo que não se pode mensurar porque não é constituído por uma duração. Nas sociedades modernas, o conceito de tempo passou a assumir outras conotações, ao ser entendido como sucessão e continuidade, desenhado de forma mais objetiva (…)

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  35. Heather Dyke (2011). The Evolutionary Origins of Tensed Language and Belief. Biology and Philosophy 26 (3):401-418.
    I outline the debate in metaphysics between those who believe time is tensed and those who believe it is tenseless. I describe the terms in which this debate has been carried out, and the significance to it of ordinary tensed language and widespread common sense beliefs that time is tensed. I then outline a case for thinking that our intuitive beliefs about tense constitute an Adaptive Imaginary Representation (Wilson, in Biol Philos 5:37–62, 1990; Wilson, in Biol Philos 10:77–97, 1995). I (…)

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      1 citation  

  36. Aron Edidin (1982). Temporal Neutrality and Past Pains. Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):423-431.

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      2 citations  

  37. Paul Fitzgerald (1972). Nowness and the Understanding of Time. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:259 – 281.

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  38. Akiko M. Frischhut (2014). Diachronic Unity and Temporal Transparency. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):34-55.
    Is it the case that, in order to have a perceptual experience as of change, duration, or any other temporally extended occurrence at all, the duration of the experience itself must come apart from the apparent duration of what is experienced? I shall argue that such a view is at least coherent. The largest part of the paper will be concerned with an objection from Ian Phillips . The objection is interesting in so far as it is an argument from (…)

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  39. Edward Fullbrook & Margaret A. Simons (2009). Commentary. Beauvoir and Sartre: The Problem of the Other; Corrected Notes. In An Unconventional History of Western Philosophy. pp. 509-523.
    Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre struggled for the whole of their philosophical careers against one of modern Western philosophy’s most pervasive concepts, the Cartesian notion of self. A notion of self is always a complex of ideas; in the case of Beauvoir and Sartre it includes the ideas of embodiment, temporality, the Other, and intersubjectivity. This essay will show the considerable part that gender, especially Beauvoir’s position as a woman in twentieth-century France, played in the development, presentation and reception (…)

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  40. Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas (2013). Do Expectations Have Time Span? Axiomathes 23 (4):665-681.
    If it is possible to think that human life is temporal as a whole, and we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that the psychological phenomena called ‘dispositions’ do not have genuine temporal duration on the basis of a distinction between dispositions and other mental processes, we need a compelling account of how time applies to these dispositions. I undertake this here by examining the concept of expectation, a disposition with a clear nexus to time by the temporal point at (…)

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  41. Brian Garrett (1988). `Thank Goodness That’s Over’ Revisited. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):201-205.

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  42. Joseph Glicksohn (2001). Temporal Cognition and the Phenomenology of Time: A Multiplicative Function for Apparent Duration. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):1-25.
    The literature on time perception is discussed. This is done with reference both to the ”cognitive-timer” model for time estimation and to the subjective experience of apparent duration. Three assumptions underlying the model are scrutinized. I stress the strong interplay among attention, arousal, and time perception, which is at the base of the cognitive-timer model. It is suggested that a multiplicative function of two key components (the number of subjective time units and their size) should predict apparent duration. Implications for (…)

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  43. George Graham (1977). Persons and Time. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):309-315.

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  44. Simon Grondin (2001). A Temporal Account of the Limited Processing Capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):122-123.
    A temporal account of the mental capacities for processing information may not be relevant in a context where the goal is to search for storage capacity expressed in chunks. However, if mental capacity and information processing is the question, the time issue can be rehabilitated. A very different temporal viewpoint on capacity limit is proposed in this commentary.

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  45. Steven Gross (forthcoming). Perception and Temporal Representation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge (2010) argues that it is, in part because perception requires a form of memory sufficiently sophisticated as to require temporal representation. I critically discuss Burge’s argument, maintaining that it does not succeed. I conclude by reflecting on the consequences for the origins of temporal representation.

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  46. Rick Grush, Internal Models and the Construction of Time: Generalizing From State Estimation to Trajectory Estimation to Address Temporal Features of Perception, Including Temporal Illusions.
    The question of whether time is its own best representation is explored. Though there is theoretical debate between proponents of internal models and embedded cognition proponents (e.g. Brooks R 1991 Artificial Intelligence 47 139–59) concerning whether the world is its own best model, proponents of internal models are often content to let time be its own best representation. This happens via the time update of the model that simply allows the model’s state to evolve along with the state of the (…)

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  47. Rick Grush, Time and Experience.
    Nothing is more obvious than the fact that we are able to experience events in the world such a ball deflecting from the cross-bar of a goal. But what is the temporal relation between these two things, the event, and our experience of the event? One possibility is that the world progresses temporally through a sequence of instantaneous states – the striker’s foot in contact with the ball, then the ball between the striker and the goal, then the ball in (…)

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  48. Rick Grush, Space, Time and Objects.
    In this paper I will outline a unified information processing framework whose goal is to explain how the nervous system represents space, time and objects. In the remainder of this introductory section I will first be more specific about the sort of spatial, temporal, and object representation at issue, and then outline the structure of this paper.

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  49. Rick Grush (2016). On the Temporal Character of Temporal Experience, its Scale Non-Invariance, and its Small Scale Structure.
    The nature of temporal experience is typically explained in one of a small number of ways, most are versions of either retentionalism or extensionalism. After describing these, I make a distinction between two kinds of temporal character that could structure temporal experience: A-ish contents are those that present events as structured in past/present/future terms, and B-ish contents are those that present events as structured in earlier-than/later-than/simultaneous-with relations. There are a few exceptions, but most of the literature ignores this distinction, and (…)

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  50. Caspar Hare (2010). Realism About Tense and Perspective. Philosophy Compass 5 (9):760-769.
    On one view of time past, present and future things exist, but their being past, present or future does not consist in their standing in before‐ and after‐relations to other things. So, for example, the event of the signing of the Magna Carta is past, and its being so does not consist in, or reduce to, its coming before the events of 2010.In this paper I discuss arguments for and against this view and view in its near vicinity, perspectival realism. (…)

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  51. Caspar Hare (2008). A Puzzle About Other-Directed Time-Bias. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):269 – 277.
    Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? ‘Sometimes yes, sometimes no’—it is tempting to answer. But this is not right. On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people.

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  52. Richard G. Henson (1967). Ordinary Language, Common Sense, and the Time-Lag Argument. Mind 76 (301):21-33.

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  53. Christoph Hoerl (2015). Seeing Motion and Apparent Motion. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):676-702.
    In apparent motion experiments, participants are presented with what is in fact a succession of two brief stationary stimuli at two different locations, but they report an impression of movement. Philosophers have recently debated whether apparent motion provides evidence in favour of a particular account of the nature of temporal experience. I argue that the existing discussion in this area is premised on a mistaken view of the phenomenology of apparent motion and, as a result, the space of possible philosophical (…)

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  54. Christoph Hoerl (2008). On Being Stuck in Time. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):485-500.
    It is sometimes claimed that non-human animals (and perhaps also young children) live their lives entirely in the present and are cognitively ‘stuck in time’. Adult humans, by contrast, are said to be able to engage in ‘mental time travel’. One possible way of making sense of this distinction is in terms of the idea that animals and young children cannot engage in tensed thought, which might seem a preposterous idea in the light of certain findings in comparative and developmental (…)

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  55. Christoph Hoerl (1998). The Perception of Time and the Notion of a Point of View. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):156-171.
    This paper aims to investigate the temporal content of perceptual experience. It argues that we must recognize the existence of temporal perceptions, i.e., perceptions the content of which cannot be spelled out simply by looking at what is the case at an isolated instant. Acts of apprehension can cover a succession of events. However, a subject who has such perceptions can fall short of having a concept of time. Similar arguments have been put forward to show that a subject who (…)

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  56. M. Holmer Nadesan (2002). M.G. Flaherty, A Watched Pot: How We Experience Time. [REVIEW] Human Studies 25 (2):257-265.

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  57. Edwin B. Holt (1904). Dr. Montague’s Theory of Time-Perception. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (12):320-323.

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  58. Ronald W. Houts (1980). Some Implications of the Time-Lag Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1/2):150-157.

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  59. Michael Jacovides (forthcoming). Locke on Perception. In Matthew Stuart (ed.), A companion to Locke. Blackwell.
    Michael Jacovides For Locke, the first step in inquiring into perception should be reflection: “What Perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, etc. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine” (2.9.2). As a second step, I say, we may learn from reading him. Locke’s use of the term ‘perception’ is somewhat broad. At one point, he tells us that “having Ideas and Perception” are “the same thing” (2.1.9). (…)

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  60. William James (1886). The Perception of Time. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 20 (4):374 – 407.

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  61. Sean D. Kelly (2005). The Puzzle of Temporal Experience. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 208–238.
    There you are at the opera house. The soprano has just hit her high note – a glassshattering high C that fills the hall – and she holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds the note for such a long time that after a while a funny thing happens: you no longer seem only to hear it, the note as it is currently sounding, that glass-shattering high C that is loud and (…)

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  62. Delmas Kiernan-Lewis (1991). Not Over Yet: Prior’s ‘Thank Goodness’ Argument. Philosophy 66 (256):241 – 243.

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  63. Stan Klein & Chloe Steindam (2016). The Role of Subjective Temporality in Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. In Kirk Michaelian, Stan Klein & Karl Szpunar (eds.), Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. Oxford University Press. pp. 135-152.
    In this chapter we examine the tendency to view future-oriented mental time travel as a unitary faculty that, despite task-driven surface variation, ultimately reduces to a common phenomenological state. We review evidence that FMTT is neither unitary nor beholden to episodic memory: Rather, it is varied both in its memorial underpinnings and experiential realization. We conclude that the phenomenological diversity characterizing FMTT is dependent not on the type of memory activated during task performance, but on the kind of subjective temporality (…)

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  64. Michal Klincewicz (2010). Quality Space Model of Temporal Perception. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6789:230-245.

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  65. Maria Kon & Kristie Miller (2015). Temporal Experience: Models, Methodology and Empirical Evidence. Topoi 34 (1):201-216.
    This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An (…)

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  66. Uriah Kriegel (2015). Experiencing the Present. Analysis 75 (3):407-413.
    There are several differences between (i) seeing rain outside one’s window and (ii) episodically remembering seeing rain outside one’s window. One difference appears to pertain to felt temporal orientation: in episodically remembering seeing the rain, we experience the rain, and/or the seeing of it, as (having occurred in the) past; in perceiving the rain, we experience the rain as (in the) present. However, according to (what is widely regarded as) the most plausible metaphysics of time, there are no such properties (…)

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  67. Andrew W. Lamb (2001). Temporal Dynamics: A Phenomenologically Based Alternative to Four-Dimensionalist and “Point-Endurantist” Views of Time. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):235-259.

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  68. G. H. Langley (1924). Values and Temporal Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 25:119 – 138.

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  69. Geoffrey Lee, Subjective Duration.

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  70. Geoffrey Lee (2014). Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience. Philosophers’ Imprint 14 (3).
    I assess a number of connected ideas about temporal experience that are introspectively plausible, but which I believe can be argued to be incorrect. These include the idea that temporal experiences are extended experiential processes, that they have an internal structure that in some way mirrors the structure of the apparent events they present, and the idea that time in experience is in some way represented by time itself. I explain how these ideas can be developed into more sharply defined (…)

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  71. Geoffrey Lee (2007). Consciousness in a Space-Time World. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):341–374.

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      3 citations  

  72. Irwin C. Lieb (1990). Time and Value. Review of Metaphysics 43 (3):475 – 494.

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  73. Murray Macbeath (1983). Communication and Time Reversal. Synthese 56 (1):27 – 46.

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  74. Ivy Mackenzie (1925). Paper: The Biological Basis of the Sense of Time. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 5 (1):64 – 102.

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  75. Teresa McCormack & Patrick Burns (2009). Temporal Information and Children’s and Adults’ Causal Inferences. Thinking and Reasoning 15 (2):167-196.
    Three experiments examined whether children and adults would use temporal information as a cue to the causal structure of a three-variable system, and also whether their judgements about the effects of interventions on the system would be affected by the temporal properties of the event sequence. Participants were shown a system in which two events B and C occurred either simultaneously (synchronous condition) or in a temporal sequence (sequential condition) following an initial event A. The causal judgements of adults and (…)

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  76. Teresa McCormack & Christoph Hoerl (2007). Young Children’s Reasoning About the Order of Past Events. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 98 (3):168-183.
    Four studies are reported that employed an object location task to assess temporal–causal reasoning. In Experiments 1–3, successfully locating the object required a retrospective consideration of the order in which two events had occurred. In Experiment 1, 5- but not 4-year-olds were successful; 4-year-olds also failed to perform at above-chance levels in modified versions of the task in Experiments 2 and 3. However, in Experiment 4, 3-year-olds were successful when they were able to see the object being placed first in (…)

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      1 citation  

  77. V. J. McGill (1930). An Analysis of the Experience of Time. Journal of Philosophy 27 (20):533-544.

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  78. Neil McKinnon, Time and Temporal Attitude Asymmetries.
    (1) Certain of our intentional attitudes appear to have time-asymmetric manifestation conditions. For instance, we dread a certain painful episode only if (we believe) it is future and feel relief about that episode only when (we believe) it is past. We eagerly anticipate events only when they are future and regard them with nostalgia only when they are past.

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  79. Neil McKinnon (2003). Presentism and Consciousness. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):305-323.
    The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced.

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  80. A. W. Moore (2004). The Metaphysics of Perspective: Tense and Colour. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):387–394.

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  81. Christopher Morgan (forthcoming). The Paradox of Thought in Advance. Philosophy and Theology.
    This paper uses a paradox inherent in any solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness to argue for God’s existence. The paper assumes we are “thought machines”, reading the state of a relevant physical medium and then outputting corresponding thoughts. However, the existence of such a thought machine is impossible, since it needs an infinite number of point-representing sensors to map the physical world to conscious thought. This paper shows that these sensors cannot exist, and thus thought cannot come solely (…)

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  82. David Morris (2008). Diabetes, Chronic Illness and the Bodily Roots of Ecstatic Temporality. Human Studies 31 (4):399-421.
    This article studies the phenomenology of chronic illness in light of phenomenology’s insights into ecstatic temporality and freedom. It shows how a chronic illness can, in lived experience, manifest itself as a disturbance of our usual relation to ecstatic temporality and thence as a disturbance of freedom. This suggests that ecstatic temporality is related to another sort of time—“provisional time”—that is in turn rooted in the body. The article draws on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Heidegger’s Being and Time , (…)

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  83. William James Quotes Mozart, Time Consciousness and the Specious Present.
    . . . and I spread it out broader and clearer, and at last it gets almost finished in my head, even when it is a long piece, so that I can see the whole of it at a single glance in my mind, as if it were a beautiful painting of a handsome human being; in which way I do not hear it in my imagination at all as a succession – the way it must come later – but (…)

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  84. J. M. Mozersky (2006). A Tenseless Account of the Presence of Experience. Philosophical Studies 129 (3):441-476.
    Tenseless theories of time entail that the only temporal properties exemplified by events are earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than. Such an account seems to conflict with our common experience of time, which suggests that the present moment is ontologically unique and that time flows. Some have argued that only a tensed account of time, one in which past, present and future are objective properties, can do justice to our experience. Any theory that claims that the world is different (…)

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  85. Gustav E. Mueller (1946). Experiential and Existential Time. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (3):424-435.

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  86. Alva Noë (2006). Experience of the World in Time. Analysis 66 (289):26–32.

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      9 citations  

  87. L. Nathan Oaklander (1992). Thank Goodness It’s Over. Philosophy 67 (260):256 – 258.

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      2 citations  

  88. Philip Percival (1992). Thank Goodness That’s Non-Actual. Philosophical Papers 21 (3):191-213.

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      1 citation  

  89. Ian Phillips (2009). Experience and Time. Dissertation, UCL
    We are no less directly acquainted with the temporal structure of the world than with its spatial structure. We hear one word succeeding another; feel two taps as simultaneous; or see the glow of a firework persisting, before it finally fizzles and fades. However, time is special, for we not only experience temporal properties; experience itself is structured in time. -/- Part One articulates a natural framework for thinking about experience in time. I claim (i) that experience in its experiential (…)

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      3 citations  

  90. Walter B. Pitkin (1914). Time and Pure Activity. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 11 (19):521-526.

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  91. Gilbert Plumer (1987). Detecting Temporalities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (3):451-460.
    This paper argues that A-determinations (past, present, and future) and B-relations (simultaneity and succession) have the same empirical status in that they are all neither historically discoverable nor sensible, but are detectable and are detectable in the same way. This constitutes a reason for thinking they are in the same class with respect to objectivity, contrary to the Russellian view that “in a world in which there was no experience there would be no past, present, or future, but there might (…)

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  92. Gilbert Plumer (1984). Time as Success. International Studies in Philosophy 16 (1):35-55.
    Partly following suggestions from Dewey, I show how we may acquire the concepts of Now and time without our being able to sense time. I rationally reconstruct these concepts by ‘deriving’ them from the concepts of ‘required for’ and ‘sensed’ (taken tenselessly). Among other reasons, because activity is explicitly required for succeeding or failing, and because these ubiquitous conditions are sensed, our concept of time is rooted squarely in our experience of these conditions.

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  93. Robin Le Poidevin (2004). A Puzzle Concerning Time Perception. Synthese 142 (1):109 – 142.
    According to a plausible and influential account of perceptual knowledge, the truth-makers of beliefs that constitute perceptual knowledge must feature in the causal explanation of how we acquire those beliefs. However, this account runs into difficulties when it tries to accommodate time perception — specifically perception of order and duration — since the features we are apparently tracking in such perception are (it is argued) not causal. The central aim of the paper is to solve this epistemological puzzle. Two strategies (…)

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      1 citation  

  94. Simon Prosser (2016). Experiencing Time. Oxford University Press UK.
    Our engagement with time is a ubiquitous feature of our lives. We are aware of time on many scales, from the briefest flicker of change to the way our lives unfold over many years. But to what extent does this encounter reveal the true nature of temporal reality? To the extent that temporal reality is as it seems, how do we come to be aware of it? And to the extent that temporal reality is not as it seems, why does (…)

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  95. Paavo Pylkkanen (2007). Mind, Matter and the Implicate Order. Springer.

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  96. Jennifer Radden (1995). Shame and Blame: The Self Through Time and Change. Dialogue 34 (01):61-.

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  97. Kenneth Rankin (1993). Intentionality and Tense. Dialogue 32 (02):383-.

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  98. C. A. Richardson (1925). Time and Its Relation to Unconsciousness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 26:87 – 96.

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  99. Louise Richardson (2014). Space, Time and Molyneux’s Question. Ratio 27 (4):483-505.
    Whatever the answer to Molyneux’s question is, it is certainly not obvious that the answer is ‘yes’. In contrast, it seems clear that we should answer affirmatively a temporal variation on Molyneux’s question, introduced by Gareth Evans. I offer a phenomenological explanation of this asymmetry in our responses to the two questions. This explanation appeals to the modality-specific spatial structure of perceptual experience and its amodal temporal structure. On this explanation, there are differences in the perception of spatial properties in (…)

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  100. Gillian Romney (1977). Temporal Points of View. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78:237 – 252.

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  101. Richard A. Schmidt (1986). Controlling the Temporal Structure of Limb Movements. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):623.

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  102. Mark F. Sharlow, Conscious Subjects in Detail: Readings in From Brain to Cosmos.
    This document consists primarily of excerpts (chapters 5 and 10-12) from the author’s book From Brain to Cosmos. These excerpts address several traditional problems about the histories of conscious subjects, using the concept of subjective fact that the author developed earlier in the book. Topics include the persistence of conscious subjects through time, the unity or disunity of the self, and the possibility of splitting conscious subjects. (These excerpts depend heavily upon the author’s concept of subjective fact as developed in (…)

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  103. Lokendra Shastri (2006). Comparing the Neural Blackboard and the Temporal Synchrony-Based SHRUTI Architectures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):84-86.
    Contrary to the assertions made in the target article, temporal synchrony, coupled with an appropriate choice of representational primitives, leads to a functionally adequate and neurally plausible architecture that addresses the massiveness of the binding problem, the problem of 2, the problem of variables, and the transformation of activity-based transient representations of events and situations into structure-based persistent encodings of the same.

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  104. F. J. Smith (1973). Musical Sound as a Model for Husserlian Intuition and Time-Consciousness. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 4 (1):271-296.

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  105. Roy Sorensen (2005). The Cheated God: Death and Personal Time. Analysis 65 (286):119–125.

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      1 citation  

  106. Matthew Soteriou (2010). Perceiving Events. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):223-241.
    The aim in this paper is to focus on one of the proposals about successful perception that has led its adherents to advance some kind of disjunctive account of experience. The proposal is that we should understand the conscious sensory experience involved in successful perception in relational terms. I first try to clarify what the commitments of the view are, and where disagreements with competing views may lie. I then suggest that there are considerations relating to the conscious character of (…)

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      5 citations  

  107. Matthew Soteriou (2007). Content and the Stream of Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):543–568.

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      11 citations  

  108. Lewis T. Stevens (1886). On the Time-Sense. Mind 11 (43):393-404.

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      4 citations  

  109. Tom Stoneham (2003). Temporal Externalism. Philosophical Papers 32 (1):97-107.
    Abstract Temporal Externalism is the view that future events can contribute to determining the present content of our thoughts and utterances. Two objections to Temporal Externalism are discussed and rejected. The first is that Temporal Externalism has implausible consequences for the epistemology of biology and other taxonomic sciences (Brown, 2000). The second is that it is committed to implausible claims about dispositions.

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      6 citations  

  110. Elzbieta Szelag & Ernst Pöppel (2000). Temporal Perception: A Key to Understanding Language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):52-52.
    Although Grodzinsky’s target article has merit, it neglects the importance of neural mechanisms underlying language functions. We present results from our clinical studies on different levels of temporal information processing in aphasic patients and briefly review the existing data on neurobiology of language to cast new light on the main thesis of the target article.

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  111. G. B. ter Meulen Alice (2003). Cognitive Modelling of Human Temporal Reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (5):623-624.
    Modelling human reasoning characterizes the fundamental human cognitive capacity to describe our past experience and use it to form expectations as well as plan and direct our future actions. Natural language semantics analyzes dynamic forms of reasoning in which the real-time order determines the temporal relations between the described events, when reported with telic simple past-tense clauses. It provides models of human reasoning that could supplement ACT-R models.

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  112. Kai Vogeley & Christian Kupke (2006). Disturbances of Time Consciousness From a Phenomenological and Neuroscientific Perspective. Schizophrenia Bulletin 33 (1):157-165.
    The subjective experience of time is a fundamental constituent of human consciousness and can be disturbed under conditions of mental disorders such as schizophrenia or affective disorders. Besides the scientific domain of psychiatry, time consciousness is a topic that has been extensively studied both by theoretical philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. It can be shown that both approaches exemplified by the philosophical analysis of time consciousness and the neuroscientific theory of cross-temporal contingencies as the neurophysiological basis of human consciousness implemented in (…)

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      13 citations  

  113. W. H. Walsh (1967). Kant on the Perception of Time. The Monist 51 (3):376-396.

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      1 citation  

  114. Sebastian Watzl (2013). Silencing the Experience of Change. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1009-1032.
    Perceptual illusions have often served as an important tool in the study of perceptual experience. In this paper I argue that a recently discovered set of visual illusions sheds new light on the nature of time consciousness. I suggest the study of these silencing illusions as a tool kit for any philosopher interested in the experience of time and show how to better understand time consciousness by combining detailed empirical investigations with a detailed philosophical analysis. In addition, and more specifically, (…)

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      4 citations  

  115. Ralph B. Winn (1943). Our Pre-Copernican Notion of Time. Journal of Philosophy 40 (15):403-411.

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  116. Robert Paul Wolff (1990). Narrative Time: The Inherently Perspectival Structure of the Human World. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):210-223.

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  117. Dan Zahavi (2011). Objects and Levels: Reflections on the Relation Between Time-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. Husserl Studies 27 (1):13-25.
    The text surveys the development of the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski regarding Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness. The main arguments on both sides are reconsidered, and a compromise is proposed.

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      2 citations  

  118. Eddy M. Zemach (1979). Time and Self. Analysis 39 (3):143 – 147.

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